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Now, surely nothing but universal education can
counterwork this tendency to the domination of capital
and the servility of labor.
—Horace Mann, Fifth Annual Report to the
Board of Education of Massachusetts, 1842

business-influenced movements to reform public education
question many of the established goals and norms of democratic
education and thus may be the vanguard of such opposition. In
order to interpret and explore these movements, this article enlists
Amy Gutmann’s work as a heuristic device. In so doing, it looks at

Introduction

T

he task of creating a public will is daunting in any
political system, but a democracy dedicated to the
principles of participation and public deliberation
faces specific challenges, including overcoming organized opposition that may not accept democratic tenets. In the sphere of
education (and social reproduction, more generally),
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both the task of instituting a unified public school system and the
organized opposition to this task within the context of a
democratic polity and its deliberative processes.
Since the 1980s, education policy in the U.S. has been
increasingly influenced by business interests and ideologies.
Examples include accountability regimes based on standardized
tests, public asset privatization (such as charter schools), performance pay (sometimes referred to as merit pay), the importation of
business “best practices,” changes in labor relations, changing
systems of evaluation, an advocacy of administrative autonomy (as
opposed to teacher autonomy), and a move away from civics
education, physical education, arts education, and music education (see, for example, Cookson, 2013; Cuban, 2004; Giroux, 2015;
Levin, 2001/2018; Nichols & Berliner, 2007).
These are intertwined and for the most part have a common
political lineage; they are based on market emulation models that
promote hierarchical authority structures, lessen professional
teacher autonomy, and at the same time provide opportunities for
private entities to make profits in the public education sector.
What is striking is that, since the 1980s, the form that influence takes, the positions that business takes, and the authority that
business wields can plausibly be interpreted as a direct response to
Amy Gutmann’s Democratic Education (1987), perhaps as an
attempt to refute its premises and principles. Rather than a
discourse on the problematic of education in a democratic society,
however, there is an emphasis on evaluation systems devised by
outside experts, concepts of merit, and the promotion of administrative autonomy vis-à-vis teachers.
Specifically, significant aspects of the pro-market education
reform movement seem to closely and negatively correlate to the
arguments Gutmann (1987) made in favor of deliberative democracy and egalitarian social goals. Moreover, two principles that
Gutmann said must not be abandoned—nonrepression and
nondiscrimination—are no longer reasons for revamping the
system but are addressed, if at all, not by core changes but by
programs appendant and appurtenant to the main. Finally—and
potentially both more important and most intriguing—there is an
effort to recast the three sources of authority that Gutmann held
are foundational in education: the state, parents, and professionals.
Gutmann’s (1987) analysis of parents, the state, and professional educators as the three sources of authority in education
seems to provide a playbook for political action. This program
consists of coopting parents via school choice, narrowing the state’s
mission, and attacking and marginalizing educators; in addition,
the profession is divided hierarchically, as tasks such as curriculum
development fall to outside educational experts and exclude
classroom teachers. Accordingly, this article is an exploratory
piece, a heuristic exercise that examines this lineage by tracing
what might be regarded as an attempt to negate and counter the
influence of Gutmann’s work.
Thus, what I suggest, half as a conceit, half as a
description—and only speculatively as an explanation of how
ideological justifications are produced—is that business influence
manifests itself in contemporary education reform as a point-by-
point rejection of Gutmann’s (1987) central goals and seems
democracy & education, vol 28, n-o 1

determined to be systematic in its rejection of Gutmann’s conclusions. One could call identifying this “seeming” a hunch, but it is a
hunch supported by evidence that points to such a pattern. There
are different types of decision-making. Consumers make decisions
that are somewhat different from the decisions a business makes
and much different from the process of deliberative decision-
making in a democracy. A chief example is the set of business
logics focused upon marketing products to different population
segments; these have to do with the discovery of individual
preferences and associated “profit pools,” including behavioral
triggers to get people to buy, not with collective decision-making.
This runs counter to the ideal of “conscious social reproduction” in
Gutmann and may reveal and clarify a diametric opposition
between market-based education and democratic education.
Overall, outcomes are based on the aggregation of individual
projects. The motivations of business and the interests of investor
classes cohere in such a manner as to advance policies that allow
for the greatest freedom of action for owners and model the labor
market so as to align with business needs and are, as a result,
antithetical to liberal democratic concerns.
The paper is divided into eight sections:
The first is “Conceits, Caveats, and Deliberative Models of
Authority.” It outlines three models of authority, each based solely
on only one of the three types: the family state, in which children
are educated for the good of the state and the sake of social
harmony; the state of families, in which parents are entrusted to
make choices for and pursue the best interests of their children;
and the state of individuals, which relies on educational professionals and expert knowledge to create institutions which maximize the future choice of children.
It begins by defining what I mean by “conceit” and continues
with the exploration of how business entered into this discourse
and the effects of that entrance, emphasizing this key point:
Business logics are guided by self-interest; democratic logics work
to arrive at a collective interest.
The second is “Some Personal and Historical Background,
Plus Diametric Opposition.” While I am not proposing that there is
a simple binary opposition between business and democracy as
one would explain them abstractly or might allegorically personify
them, I am noting there is at least a diametric and recurring
tension between accepted values in business (as reinforced
especially by competitive business practice) and normative values
in liberal democracy, especially those advocating democratic
deliberation. One impact of this dynamic that seems obvious is
that, keeping in mind the power of wealth, democratic practitioners tend to call for state oversight and regulation of private
projects, while business practitioners tend to look askance at such
state actions, labeling them counterproductive. This is not true in
all cases, but overall, whether deliberation is considered a method
of democratic-will formation or a total theory of democratic
society, it will likely rub business the wrong way. The impact of
profit-seeking enterprises, in contrast, is largely actuated by
advancing a particularistic set of interests, a set of preferences that
are likely to come into conflict with the set of interests arrived at by
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a process of deliberation that is thought to be constitutive and to
reshape preferences.
The contrast is clear. Deliberative democratic logics draw on a
normative theory of the educational purposes of society, which
postulates that democracy must shape education so that the
educated are capable of deliberation. This section also begins a
brief discussion drawing on John Dewey’s (1916/1997) Democracy
and Education that continues in the following sections.
This includes the third section, “Neoliberal Ideology, the
Public Will and Organized Opposition,” which begins with attacks
on public education that go back 60 years or so, to Admiral
Rickover and President Eisenhower in the 1950s promoting
back-to-basics education and explicitly attacking Dewey’s influence. Briefly summarizing some of the main tenets of neoliberalism as expounded on by Bourdieu, Harvey, and others, I then
expand on Dewey’s defense of democratic education. For Dewey,
to “participate in an interest” is more than a transaction—it is a
transformative experience, sharply distinct from merely following
an interest. Preferences are not assumed but are reshaped during
the deliberative process. Thus, there is an antagonism between the
particularistic interests that drive business practice and its
aggregated outcomes and the communicated experience that arises
out of deliberation on shared, overlapping, and sometimes
conflicting interests. The section concludes by quickly looking at
the perspectives of, among others, William Weld, Milton Friedman, Myron Lieberman, and John Chubb and Terry Moe.
“Proxies for Children, a Purported Insight, and Changed
Questions: Agendas, Authority, and Influence,” the fourth section
briefly considers the question “Why should the business community not also be considered a source of authority?” It eventually
reviews Gutmann’s (1987) critiques of focusing on one type of
authority in education, but it first points out that, unlike business,
all three of Gutmann’s sources of authority have custodial roles.
The business community has no such role except in the small
minority of cases in which schools are being run as businesses, but
parents, the state, and schools serve as proxies for children in
different ways—in terms of, respectively, direct parental custody,
the state’s role as custodian of last resort, and the schools’ role in
loco parentis.
The fifth section, “Contrasting Perspectives on Testing
Regimes, Productivity, and Creativity,” considers paradigm change
and how testing and data are central to contemporary education
reform. Paradigm change is, of course, broader than this and
includes privatization and the deregulation movement.1 Still, in
1 Paradigm change involves much more than testing and data collection, which are instrumental techniques, but testing nonetheless enables
other policies, such as pay-for-performance and phasing out “failing
schools.” We can think of testing as one pillar of a market-emulation
paradigm—a proxy for profits. School choice and competition are others:
Public school education has experienced notable changes in
governance and control over the past three decades primarily
due to school choice laws and policies. . . . the growth in magnet
schools and quasi-public schools such as charter schools, as well
as the use of public dollars to finance a private-school education
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reviewing changes in educational discourse and policy, especially
in the 1980s and 1990s, it is argued that business perspectives most
often hold that we set the strong-minded and capable economic
actors who can navigate the market in motion and watch them
make change. Equity and social justice became secondary
concerns.
This, again, contrasts with perspectives that emphasize
democratic practice, but the section also raises the question of
creativity and how the testing paradigm has affected it. Most
pedagogical programs at least give lip service to producing critical
and creative thinkers, but for advocates of democratically oriented
education, this means capable democratic actors who, among
other things, might question the wisdom of constantly following
the directions in which the market and its incentives take us. For
business-oriented educators, it means encouraging those who
produce innovations that may have value in the market. Meanwhile, creativity among youth has declined and education reforms
are all over the place—in some places drill-and-kill is adopted as
much as problem-based learning because the tests are standardized and the answers can be memorized, at least many of them.
“Capitalist Exploitation, Good and Bad: Contending Perspectives Historically Considered” is the sixth section. This is a
meta-theoretical section, considering “the problems of
capital(ism)’s excesses.” If we take the three factors of production,
land, labor, and capital, the last is the dominant factor in capitalism. Moreover, the way capitalism works, capital is mean to exploit
the other factors of production. The section looks briefly at the
historical context of business influence, especially as identified by
Kliebard (1986).
“Business Logics and the Marginalization of Democratic
Deliberation” is the seventh section. Identifying business logics
with a specific, market-oriented version of what Kliebard (1986)
called the “social efficiency” approach, the section begins by
arguing that this was hardly how education was argued for in the
early days of the American republic. In contemporary discourse,
in contrast, we are more likely to see mainstream business logics in
which the goal of creating a deliberative democracy engaged
in conscious social reproduction is eschewed in favor of accepting
the outcomes of the market. There is also some mention of the
march of great men (and some women) of talent pursuing simultaneously their own self-interest and their own idiosyncratic vision à
la Ayn Rand. This is the core of business influence and how it
operates. It is no longer the foremost role of public education to
foster basic democratic principles, such as equal opportunity and
liberty, that have an inherent value, but education is an instrument
to other ends. It advocates the pervasive theory that, if not the
family, then the state and educational professionals might in fact be

with vouchers have made it more challenging to recognize who
or what controls public schools in each state. The transformation
in school choice policies has been made possible mainly because
of the United States’ political and economic environment that
supports deregulation, marketplace competition, and decentralization. (Thompson Dorsey & Plucker)
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the source of a problem that could be solved by applying common
sense—the common sense of what works in business.
Finally, the eighth section, “The Common Sense of Segmentation,” considers some of the dangers we encounter because what
works in business is not always something that works in democracy. In business, inequality, class, and stratification are not
necessarily concerns—in fact, they may be seen as opportunities.
The question then becomes, what happens to education when the
primary ethos of a society is acquisitive, grasping—in short,
monetary? Looking at the dynamic of stratification, it points to
something new that, while it is not so neatly delimited, we can
nonetheless see clearly in the institutional forms of publicly funded
education. Business strategies that aim to segment the market
in education have shown robust growth, and since the 1980s,
marketers have used economic and behavioral theories combined
with data heavy analytical techniques to identify market segments
and develop strategies to take advantage of differentiation opportunities. What private business strategies do is segment the market.
The section then examines how a market or population is subdivided into segments with defined similar characteristics—dividing
a broad target market into “subsets of consumers” who have
common needs and priorities.
In conclusion, decision-making by consumers, businesses,
and deliberators in a democracy are different in kind. The question
is raised as to whether the pervasiveness of business and consumer
logics conflict with the promise of egalitarian democracy. The first
two are centered on individual interests, but the last is collective.
The last is also largely based on the promise of public
education—that it function to educate the vast majority of citizens
so that they may aspire and succeed, participate in politics, have
sufficient agency to help to shape the future.

Conceits, Caveats, and Deliberative Models of Authority
According to the political philosopher Amy Gutmann (1987), there
are, broadly speaking, three types of political theories of education:
those that give authority over education to the family, those that
give it to the state, and those that give it to education professionals.
Gutmann then outlined three models, each based solely on only
one of the three types: the state of families, in which parents are
entrusted to make choices for and pursue the best interests of their
children; the family state, in which children are educated for the
good of the state and the sake of social harmony; and the state of
individuals, which relies on educational professionals and expert
knowledge to create institutions that maximize the future choice of
children, “without prejudicing children towards any controversial
conception of the good life” (Gutmann, p. 34).
Of course, whenever one says there are three kinds of anything, it is a simplification and often a conscious oversimplification
for the sake of clarify. In this case, for instance, one might consider
human communities other than the state as being sources of
authority; one might question the definition of family; and one
might wonder if, as an alternative to education professionals,
we might consider giving authority to those who are deemed
somehow to have a “calling” for educating the young. It is unlikely
that Guttmann (1987), whose Democratic Education has been
democracy & education, vol 28, n-o 1

praised as the most important book on the role of education in a
democracy since Dewey (Yudof, 1989), is unaware of this. Rather,
she has not been willing to embrace any single viewpoint but
offered a model that incorporates all three, seeking a balance
among them.
The point of her argument is clear: None of the above is by
itself sufficient for a democratic polity. Gutmann ended up
rejecting all three models. Unwilling to embrace any of these
viewpoints, she called for a “democratic state of education [which]
attempts to balance the power of the state, parents, and educational
experts and officials” (Gutmann, 1987, p. 42).
With all this, it is interesting to note that “business” and
“markets,” so much the woof and warp of contemporary debates on
education reform, are words that do not appear among her chapter
titles or the titles of the subsections. Nor is business included in her
threefold division of authority. This is doubly striking because the
most forceful calls for education reform of the current day look not
to the state, not to the family, not to “future” individuals (nor, by
any means, to educational professionals acting on their behalf) to
be the main actor. Rather, they seek to authorize a fourth group
to shape the future of public education in the U.S.: business. If one
were to rank the influence of different coalitions on education
policy in the U.S., near the top would be the coalition centered
on the globally connected business community and those who
feel they have a calling to use business methods to improve and
reform the school system.
Further, this rewriting of authority also has consequences for
both curriculum, in both its broad and narrow senses, and for
Gutmann’s (1987) major principles, those of nondiscrimination
and nonrepression. Cuban (2004) listed three questions that
remain “unasked by business-inspired reform [and] go unanswered today.” First, do “schools geared toward preparing workers
also build literate, active, and morally sensitive citizens who carry
out their civic duties?” Second, if it is possible at all, how “can
schools develop independently thinking citizens who earn their
living in corporate workplaces?” These two overlap considerably
with much of the discussion below, but Cuban also raised a third:
When “unemployment increases, and graduates have little money
to secure higher education or find a job matched to their skills, will
public schools, now an arm of the economy, get blamed—as they
have in the past—for creating the mismatch” (Cuban, 2004,
pp. 237–240)?
In addition, however, omitted from the current economic and
political agendas, we can include two of Gutmann’s (1987) major
normative principles, those of nondiscrimination and nonrepression. Gutmann’s principles of nondiscrimination and nonexclusion are sometimes given lip service, but the ways they are
normally used—to buoy “high-performing charter schools” or
programs to revamp teacher evaluation—are not necessarily
consistent with providing high-quality education for everyone
or improving the quality of teaching.2
2 I realize this, along with others that follow, is an argument that still
needs to be made more fully. I will not do so here, however, because this
article is quite long as it is. Besides, reaching any definitive conclusion
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The principle of nondiscrimination states all educable
children must be educated, not, as often is the case with private
schools, vouchers, and charters, as with programs that select poor
students with potential and send them elsewhere,3 that some
children will be selected out to go to better schools.
The related principle of nonexclusion means that no one may
be excluded from being educated so as to have the tools for
participating in our democracy. However, while testing regimes
and pay-for-performance systems do develop tools, the tools they
are likely to develop are arguably much narrower. This is for many
reasons, including gaming the system and deep-seated social
inequalities and social pathologies associated with lower socio
economic status.
One is tempted to say that in most current debates, nondiscrimination and nonexclusion are not imperatives but platitudes.
Accordingly, the present article starts from a conceit—that
business influence manifests itself in education reform as a
point-by-point rejection of the central goals of Gutmann’s (1987)
Democratic Education. This is not a fact but a somewhat fanciful
would be, to say the least, difficult. The argument in favor of school
choice aligns with our common sense as consumers in the market: It
engenders competition, and this will be a positive force “generat[ing]
greater educational opportunities, particularly for disadvantaged
students.” The premise is that “competitive incentives will change the
organizational behavior of schools” and districts, leading “to more
equitable access for students across varied and often segregated urban
landscapes” (Lubienski, Gulosino, & Weitzel, 2009). Nonetheless, the
premise has been challenged; indeed, Lubienski, Gulosino, and Weitzel
(2009) pointed to “patterns of exclusionary strategies that schools
embraced to enhance market position.” More critically, Thompson
Dorsey and Roulhac (2019) argued, first, that “school choice policies
and the movement to privatize education have become the currently
preferred school reform methods on both the state and federal levels,”
but, then said this seems to be merely “under the guise they will provide
equal educational opportunities and access for all students,” and further
“contend[ed] that the present-day school choice and privatization
movements may be a part of a larger social, political, and legal cycle of
inequality that has established residence in the American educational
system for more than a century” (pp. 420–441). Clearly there are
different schools of thought on this.
3 Examples would include Prep for Prep (PFP) and A Better Chance
(ABC). For others, see “A Guide to Programs Sending Kids to Better
Schools,” accessed November 2019 at https://www.education.com/
magazine/article/Scholarship_Programs_that_Send/. I mention PFP and
ABC not to single them out for criticism but merely because at different
times in my life I interviewed with both of them, and I did so because I
felt they both had the potential to make positive contributions. However,
neither seems to be truly scalable to the degree one would need, and
both also have potential negative effects because they remove students
from their home communities. Instead of addressing the inequality
of neighborhood resources and building up “a cadre of role models
accessible to students” in their neighborhood or community, they “take
the opposite approach—they take students into educational settings
where high levels of community resources already exist” (Gandera, with
Bial, 2001, p. 33). For an in-depth account based on interviews with
participants, see R. Martin, 2019.
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argument, and it cannot be proven conclusively one way or
another. However, I offer as a hypothesis that we can presents facts,
patterns of events, and transconfigurations of discourse that point
to a paradigm shift in education, or at least multiple efforts to
change the paradigm of public education. These seem to have
foundational understandings of education’s role in society that are
economistic and run counter to Gutmann’s foundational understandings of education’s role in a democratic society.
Thus the conceit is that there is both a systematic disavowal of
her goals, treating them as, at best, lower priorities, and a grand
strategy that draws on her description of the three pillars of
authority in education in order to bring about political support for
this economistic changes. As a suggestion, it can open avenues of
inquiry—the conceit is meant to be an imaginative construct
pointing to the negative correlation between the principles of
deliberative democracy and pervasive business logics. In turn, this
leads to a more sophisticated understanding of the objects of the
comparisons and of the processes by which education reform has
accrued.
The word “conceit” is often used in literary criticism to
describe metaphors. According to Dame Helen Gardner (1961), “a
conceit is a comparison whose ingenuity is more striking than its
justness . . . we are made to concede likeness while being strongly
conscious of unlikeness” (Gardner, p. xxiii).4 Thus anyone seeking
a detailed, sociological, or technical depiction of ideological
production will be disappointed; rather, the purpose at hand is to
draw attention to certain aspects of business-oriented education
reform that run contrary to democratic ends in general and to
deliberative democracy and democratic education in particular.5
Gutmann’s understanding of education has been tightly
coupled with her work on deliberative democracy,6 as she has
claimed that democratic education must have as its goal the
development and instilling of deliberative character, one consisting
4 Shakespeare, however, gives the word to Edgar in King Lear, so as
to mean “illusion” or “imagination”: “I know not how conceit may rob/
The treasury of life, when life itself/Yields to the theft” (Act IV, Scene VI;
Edgar is speaking about his newly blind father, Gloucester, who relies
on Edgar’s reports to imagine the reality about him).
5 There is, nonetheless, one very relevant point to be made on ideological justifications: Their political production and formation involves
coalitions. For instance, taking the coalition pushing for reform along
Democrats for Education Reform (DFER) lines, there are three groups
with different beliefs who converge. There are “true believers,” who think
the statistics, case studies, and other research shows that we should
adopt these measures to improve the system; there are political actors
who see political advantage in adopting those positions; and there are
those who think the adoption of these measures presents an economic
opportunity.
6 This has also been both well-regarded and highly influential. Moreover, it is worth noting that Gutmann has been a practical educator at the
highest level, becoming the president of the University of Pennsylvania
in 2004. How being the president of a private, voluntary, and selective
university relates to her understandings of public, compulsory, and universal K–12 education is, however, an open question.
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of “sturdy moral character” together with “a developed capacity for
reasoning.” The democratic state of education does not merely
balance different types of authority—it also questions all authority.
The inculcation of deliberative character should be democratic
education’s particular purpose: “Children must learn not just to
behave in accordance with authority but to think critically about
authority if they are to live up to the democratic ideal of sharing
political sovereignty as citizens” (Gutmann, 1987, p. 51).
Authority is a central issue, and an anecdote may bring some
clarity. In my twenties, I wore a button that said, “Question
Authority,” sometimes pinned to a T-shirt with the words, “Read,
Think, Write, Speak.” (I also at different times wore a button that
said, “Wearing buttons is not enough,” but that is another story.)
The “Question Authority” button bothered one friend. He was a
vice president (among many) of a major Swiss investment bank,
and he grimaced with impatience as he asked why I had to bring
attention to myself with that button. I explained that behind my
snarky, critical, idealist persona, I was a democratic pragmatist and
thus wanted to bring attention to our role as critics of those
elements of our system that were unjust, wrongheaded, or unwise.
His take on pragmatism was different than mine. A few years
later he told me, “Over time you become more pragmatic.” When
asked what he meant by “pragmatic,” he responded, almost as if the
answer to the question was self-evident, “I mean pragmatic in your
own self-interest” (Anonymous, personal communication, May
1994).
One need not rely on that single quote; one need only look
at business magazines and the advice they offer. The ideology of
business—its foundational understandings—is manifest in the
advice given to people who want to get ahead and which the
magazines say they would do well to take to heart. Moreover, they
tend to project that life-view on everyone else as well.
Certainly it was true that my friend had grown more pragmatic as he grew older. However, it was not, for him, a personal
statement: He stated it as a general truth. I don’t want to make too
big a generalization, but this life-view holds that those who do not
put their self-interest front and center are somehow deluding
themselves by indulging “an overdeveloped sense of social justice.”7
Whether it applies to everyone or not, business affects this, at least
to a degree; if we are involved in business day in, day out, we then
become more calculating—and self-interestedly pragmatic—as we
adopt the norms of business.
That points to the key point: Business logics are guided by
self-interest; democratic logics work to arrive at a collective
interest. The attitude toward authority is illustrative. While I would
argue that questioning authority is a necessary and constitutive
part of deliberative democracy, business logics how to understand
7 For an example of how those with an “overdeveloped sense of justice”
are prone to over-the-top “indignation,” see the discussion between
business and law school students (one of whom has a bullhorn) and sociology grad students (one of whom quotes Schiller and begins to define
post-structuralism), in Tucker Max (2012), Sloppy Seconds, Blue Heeler,
pp. 26–27. I am not quite sure, incidentally, how this book ended up in
my house.
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authority and how it affects opportunity. Not to put too fine a point
on this key point, we can say that instead of questioning it, one
accepts and reinforces authority, strengthens administrative
hierarchy, and brings in administrative experts to make money off
newly strengthened hierarchies.
Still, business logics do not accept authority passively; rather,
they analyze and adapt themselves to it, manipulate and seek to
direct it. In business and economic activity, the questioning of
authority is, accordingly, not primary; rather, stress is on the ability
to recognize and take advantage of opportunities. Along with this
comes the ability to sometimes construct and promote opportunities. Entrepreneurs find niches—this is part of the foundational
understanding—but politically networked entrepreneurs can
create niches. They do not so much question authority as massage
and then redirect it.
This is the contrast to which the conceit will point: Business
logics turn the logic of deliberative democracy on its head.
Deliberative democracy can be defined
as a form of government in which free and equal citizens (and their
representatives), justify decisions in a process in which they give one
another reasons that are mutually acceptable and generally accessible,
with the aim of reaching conclusions that are binding in the present on
all citizens but open to challenge in the future. (Gutmann &
Thompson, 2004, p. 7; see also discussion, pp. 4–21, some of which is
paraphrased immediately following)

Deliberation, to the extent it is inclusive and nonarbitrary, legitimizes political decisions. The standard that is enshrined is the
collective judgment of the governed as arrived at by an open and
mutually respectful processes of public decision-making that
posits public-spirited perspectives.
In business, however, it is the aggregated judgment of those
engaging in economic activity that is the standard. A thousand (or
a million) choices add up to what the market tells us. While there
are some arguments that this will inevitably be in the public
interest, that is hardly foreordained. The most famous quote
indicating the benign effects from the market is, of course, from
Adam Smith (1776):
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the baker, or the brewer
that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.
We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and
never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.
(Smith, chapter 2)

Self-interest is not greed, however. That Smith distinguished
between self-interest and selfishness is often ignored.8 Significantly,
this ignorance might not be accidental, but a common
occurrence—a mental construct—in a competitive, calculating,
8 Smith’s paragraph begins:
He will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love
in his favour, and show them that it is for their own advantage
to do for him what he requires of them. Whoever offers to
another a bargain of any kind, proposes to do this. (Kennedy,
2009a, 2009b)
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and self-interestedly pragmatic milieu that includes rent seekers as
well as producers. One should note that Smith took his examples
from a limited group of economic activities, all of which are
producers for direct consumption; it is unlikely that Smith would
have sanguinely and without caveat included financiers, public
relations specialists, lobbyists (the word had not yet been coined),
advertisers, or marketers alongside them.9 But even in the
productive trades, according to Smith, we have to worry about
cartels and combinations: “People of the same trade seldom meet
together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation
ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to
raise prices” (Smith, 1776, book I, chapter X). Cartel formation,
moreover, is an extreme example of a more general phenomenon.
Actors take the information they gather from the market to
pragmatically pursue their self-interests. The goal in business is not
to promote the legitimacy of collective decisions or subject
preferences to scrutiny—preferences are a given to be discovered,
the raw material on which to build business strategies. They are not
questioned but used, manipulated in some instances, altered and
shaped in others. Market research and advertising provide some
salient examples; lobbying, think tanks, and philanthropy provide
others.10 The point is not to deliberate and, when in disagreement,
discover the reasons for this disagreement while still promoting
mutual respect; rather, the point is to get the other to accept your
view of what is necessary and worthwhile, to spend money on
your product or to accept your point of view, and to get your
project on track.
The contrast is clear. Deliberative democratic logics draw on a
normative theory of the educational purposes of society which
postulates that democracy must shape education so that the
educated are capable of deliberation. It is a clever construction in
which the snake swallows its own tale.11
Dewey (1916/1997) made much the same point and then
extended upon it in Democracy and Education: “The devotion of
democracy to education is a familiar fact. The superficial
Greed—even the appearance of greed—would poison such a
bargain.
9 Moreover, while often misquoted, Smith used “brewer” instead of
“candlestick maker,” raising the question of whether he prioritized beer
over light.
10 Theoretically extreme, but everyday and increasingly commonplace,
are consumer-oriented business strategies that “push us to sever all links
with the evidence of our senses.” Online strategies, such as
the monetisation of propaganda as “fake news”; the use of
machine learning to develop user profiles accurately measuring
and modeling our emotional states; the rise of neuromarketing,
targeting highly tailored messages that nudge us to act in
ways serving the ends of others; [and the] a new technology,
“augmented reality,” [are among] the processes shaping our drift
to a new world in which reality is both relative and carefully
constructed by others, for their ends. (Pesce, 2017)
11 My apologies for the pun, but narratives and understandings in
public discourse are central concerns.
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explanation is that a government resting upon popular suffrage
cannot be successful unless those who elect and who obey their
governors are educated” (Dewey, pp. 91–92). He then went on to
say, “But there is a deeper explanation,” as discussed later.
Business logics, especially those that laud the invisible hand,
frame the question of education much differently, looking for the
individual to develop skills and capacities to navigate the system as
it develops “naturally” over time. The individual is not a deliberative citizen but a consumer following preferences or a potential
worker seeking remunerated employment or an investor seeking
opportunities.
This logic transfers to politics as opportunities must be
recognized by power holders and they must devote resources to
fully exploit them. This is true of both enterprises that must find
their own revenue stream (the private sector) and those that
depend on a revenue stream decided upon through collective
decision-making as manifest in state action (the public sector). In
addition, individuals must also produce their own revenue
streams—or their families must.12
Of course, there are other business logics that stress factors
having little to do with the “invisible hand,” such as organizational
capacity and long-term management.13 Nonetheless, those that are
management focused tend toward the hierarchical, not the
democratic. Business logics emphasizing management do tend to
run counter to narratives that focus on the entrepreneur, and it is
arguable that much of the individualistic ethos fueling proposed
neoliberal solutions diverts us, intentionally or otherwise, from the
reality of managerial power. It can also be argued that investors,
thanks in part to stockholder-rights movements and in larger part
to improved financial communications and new financial instruments, have gained the upper hand over the last 40 years at the
expense of managers. One does not have to choose between these
two, however. Both the reality of long-term managerial power and
12 This is a thought, incidentally, made resoundingly by Margaret
Thatcher when she said there was no such thing as society, only individuals and families. Here might be the fulcrum of the Thatcherite revolution,
relevant in that we are presuming a paradigm change that took hold
about the same time she took office (and she also had extensive plans for
education). Interestingly and significantly, we can compare her statement
to one from Dewey (1916/1997):
Society is one word, but many things. Men associate together in
all kinds of ways and for all kinds of purposes. One man is concerned in a multitude of diverse groups, in which his associates
may be quite different. It often seems as if they had nothing in
common except that they are modes of associated life. (Dewey,
p. 86)
13 Particularly pertinent is Chandler’s The Visible Hand (1977), which
highlighted administrative coordination, managerial hierarchy, and
middle managers who preferred policies that favored long-term stability
and growth of their enterprises to those that maximized current profits.
He argued managerial hierarchy itself became a source of power, permanence, and continued growth; large enterprises grew and dominated
major sectors of the economy, altering the basic structure of these sectors
and of the economy as a whole.
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greater investor power are real things in education, however, as
large companies take over management tasks formerly performed
by public entities. As is usually the case in public asset privatization, both investors and managers have opportunities to benefit.
In sum, according to the deliberative democratic logic,
education is designed to promote and support open debate on
public issues, critical thinking, collective outcomes, and mutual
respect. This contrasts to business logics. In the neoliberal business
logic, education is designed to allow for the pursuit of private
interests, critical analysis of the changing market, individual
adaptation, and aggregated outcomes. In the managerial business
logic, education is designed to equip people who can man the
machinery of business organizations.
The neoliberal logic calls for less state involvement and a
curriculum based on the ability to find one’s niche. The administrative logic calls for a curriculum that trains people to perform
business tasks. Both give us a hint of what to expect as we now turn
to the question of how business influences education.

Some Personal and Historical Background, Plus Diametric
Opposition
This article is drawn from a manuscript waiting to be a book,
Democratic Education and Markets, which takes half its title from
Gutmann’s 1987 book but concentrates on business, markets, and
the underlying goals thereof. It is not merely that business has
influence in education debates—that is something that has been
true since at least the early 1900s. What we find is that we are not
dealing with disinterested policymaking but an agenda-laden
process in which the agendas are not usually on the surface layers
but are deeply rooted and are informed by the eye of the profit
hunter (Ford 2016a, 2016b).
The implications of this for democracy have been widely
commented upon. For instance, Paul Thomas (2013) argued:
Education reformers have framed the need for national standards,
increased testing, and greater teacher accountability as essential for
creating a world-class work force and to keep the U.S. competitive
internationally. But this narrative serves as a mask for the ultimate
results promised by such reform—shifting the locus of authority and
expertise away from teachers, professors, and scholars [emphasis
added] and to state created and enforced instruments that render
people powerless and interchangeable. (pp. 204–205)14

I would add that those “state created and enforced instruments” are
both increasingly modeled upon the market, employing so-called
best practices derived from business, and increasingly open to
nonstate actors.
Since the 1980s, the form that influence takes, the positions
that business takes and the authority that business wields, could
plausibly be interpreted as a direct response to Gutmann
14 In a shorter article for The Guardian (16 Nov 2010), Thomas summarized: “The messages coming from state education in the US, then, are
that government has failed and that only the private sector can save us.”
One comment contested this, but yet another seconded it: “Education,
like healthcare provision, is not a right but a business opportunity.”
democracy & education, vol 28, n-o 1

(1987)—an attempt to refute its premises and principles. Thus, the
article explores this lineage by tracing what might be regarded as a
negative doppelganger of Gutmann’s work. Significant aspects of
the pro-market education reform movement seem to closely and
negatively correlate to the arguments she made in favor of
deliberative democracy and egalitarian social goals. Accordingly,
we expand on the conceit—that business influence manifests itself
in education reform as a point-by-point rejection of Gutmann’s
central goals.
Or, rather, we shall start from a conceit and a caveat, for while
market-oriented education reform could be interpreted in this way,
this is not to say that it actually developed this way. One need not
posit a conspiracy.
One need not, but that is not to say there is no evidence to
support conspiratorial coordination, either overt or covert. One
can go back to Admiral Rickover and President Eisenhower in the
1950s promoting back-to-basics education and explicitly attacking
Dewey’s influence.15 Or one could look at soon to be Supreme
Court Justice Louis Powell’s famous 1971 memo to the Chairman
of the Education Committee of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.16
In the years that followed, many institutions, including the
Heritage Foundation, the Manhattan Institute, the Cato Institute,
Citizens for a Sound Economy, Accuracy in Academia (explicitly
against “liberal bias in education”), and the Olin Foundation, were
created.
15 Admiral Hyman Rickover, original head of development of the
nation’s nuclear submarine program, wrote Education and Freedom
(New York: Dutton, 1959) after the launch of the Sputnik by the Soviets.
Rickover blamed Dewey, unfairly lumping him together with the “educationists” who had emphasized “life-adjustment education” focused
on adolescents’ personal as opposed to their intellectual development.
Thinking U.S. schools too lax and education standards too low to produce the technical expert who would be “the man of the future,” Rickover
later wrote both Swiss Schools and Ours: Why Theirs are Better (Little,
Brown, 1962) and American Education, a National Failure: The Problem
of Our Schools and What We Can Learn from England (Dutton, 1963).
Eisenhower, as president, published a letter in Life magazine
(March 15, 1959) that was similar. It descried the weaknesses of U.S.
education and attributed them to Dewey’s influence while advocating
a back-to-basics approach. The attacks, which were much more widespread, were significant, and Jeffrey Herold (1974) said the “account of
how Dewey had corrupted the schools was sheer fantasy” (p. 150).
16 While focused on the postsecondary level and advocating measures
such as “establishing a staff of highly qualified scholars in the social
sciences who do believe in the system . . . a staff of speakers of the
highest competency . . . a Speaker’s Bureau [and the] evaluat[ion] of
social science textbooks, especially in economics, political science
and sociology,” he also called for “Action programs, tailored to the
high schools and similar to those mentioned” for colleges. The covert
memo’s confidentially became a thing of the past when it was leaked to
Jack Anderson. In a syndicated column, “Powell’s Lesson to Business
aired,” September 28, 1972, Anderson cited it, warning that Powell, who
had been elevated to the Court in January of that year, “might use his
position on the Supreme Court to put his ideas into practice . . . in behalf
of business interests.”
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At the same time, Milton Friedman became a PBS star and
anti-Keynesian monetarist texts multiplied while Paul Samuelson’s
Keynesian-oriented Economics textbook ceased to the standard. Or
we could look to the passage of Proposition 13, enacted in 1978,
becoming article XIII A of the California Constitution, which
limited the annual real estate tax on a parcel of property to 1% of its
assessed value; since schools depend on property taxes, it had huge
ramifications. Or there is A Nation at Risk (National Commission
on Excellence in Education, 1983), discussed later. The actions of
the Broad Foundation, the New Teacher Project, the Gates
Foundation, and many others also point to multiple efforts.
Nonetheless, one need hardly contend that the movers and
shakers of industry and finance gathered together at a conference
center or an enormous private estate, read Gutmann’s work
alongside Hayek’s and Ayn Rand’s, compared it unfavorably with
those works, analyzed it point by point and then gathered together
to launch a campaign to shape American education in the opposite
way. Indeed, if you concentrate your explanation by offering up
conspiracy theories, you miss a lot of the action. But if that is not
what happened and if I am right that the main tenets of market-
oriented education reform negatively correlate with Gutmann’s
theory, then how did that happen? What forces led to this
outcome?
Not to dismiss active efforts to shape thought, but if one does
posit a conspiracy, certain dynamics will be overlooked. A large
part of the answer to this puzzle is systematically rooted in the
structure of economic incentives and accepted business strategies.
Overall, we can suggest that the motivations of business and the
interests of investor classes cohere in such a manner as to advance
policies that, predictably, allow for the greatest freedom of action
for owners, model the labor market so as to align with business
needs, and are, as result, antithetical to liberal democratic concerns
in general and, in particular to deliberative democracy and
egalitarian goals (Ford, n.d.).
Take, for example, the business logics focused upon marketing products to different population segments. These do not have
to do with collective decision-making, rather with the discovery of
individual preferences in order to craft a business strategy. As will
be discussed, the “collective” outcome is based on the aggregation
of individual business projects.
Overall, this is not to propose there is a binary opposition
between “business” and “democracy” as one would explain them
abstractly or might allegorically personify them. “Business” and
“democracy” both have too many aspects to do that. It is rather to
note there is at least a diametric tension between accepted values in
business (as reinforced especially by competitive business practice)
and normative values in liberal democracy, especially those
advocating democratic deliberation.17
17 This gives me a chance to acknowledge my two anonymous
Democracy & Education reviewers, one of whom was quite positive,
one of whom was more skeptical, both of whom offered insight and
helped improve the article. The latter was particularly concerned that I
had presented a “binary opposition between democracy and business,”
something that I did not think was the case but had to admit was a
democracy & education, vol 28, n-o 1

We can illustrate this by posing a question: Should the
democratic state have oversight authority and the ability to regulate
private projects? If so, to what degree? I am not going to go into
depth on this subject but just offer a heads-up: The democratic
principle tends to call for an institutionalized state actor with
oversight capacity and the ability to regulate private business
actions to significant degree, but the business principle not
so much.
This is not an absolute but a tendency. The “business side”
during the early days of the republic through the 1840s was led by
figures such as Hamilton and Henry Clay who called for an
energetic federal government that could take on debt, run a
banking system, fund infrastructure, and otherwise enable
economic advance; their partisan opponents, such as Jefferson and
Jackson, labeled themselves Democrats (and in the latter case even
called his assembled supporters “the Democracy”) and eventually
shut down the Bank of the United States in the 1830s, so that the
U.S. had a largely unregulated banking system until the creation of
the Federal Reserve in 1913.
The U.S. did not have a central bank from 1836 until the advent
of the Federal Reserve just prior to the first World War. After the
Civil War, when America began to become the world’s greatest
industrial power, “Great Britain served as the premier banker to
American railways and factories, powering the country’s economic
growth at a time when American finance could not have managed
the feat alone” (Chernow, 2017, p. 727). During that period, the U.S.
suffered through recurrent panics, one every 20 years of so—1837,
1857, 1873, 1893 and 1907. (Thanks, Andrew Jackson!) For the most
part, they were addressed by private, rather than public, intervention, such as that of financier J. P. Morgan. In 1907 Morgan led a
group of New York bankers to pledge large sums of their own
money to steady the market by injecting liquidity back into the
market (Ahamed, 2009).18 They did so in the place of the
independent treasury system, created by Congress in 1846, that
supposedly managed the federal government’s money supply
through the U.S. Treasury until 1913, but by 1907 it was recognized
that it was ineffectual and sometimes counterproductive, often
allowing revenue surpluses to accumulate and thus tightening
credit.
plausible interpretation. Like most good criticism, it was at first vexing.
While something approaching a binary opposition—a dramatic and
dynamic opposing tension—may be generally the case as regards state
oversight and regulation, it is much more complex than that politically
and ideological coalition formation is a political phenomenon that draws
from groups with different beliefs. To the extent that one presents a
simple binary opposition, one is oversimplifying and misrepresenting
a complex political process, so I particularly appreciate that the vexing
question was asked. However, if anyone complains about this article’s
length, I felt I had to address the question—some of the blame goes to
the reviewer who asked the question in the first place.
18 Morgan “had lived through more panics than had any other, in 1895
actually bailing out the United States government itself when it was
within days of running out of gold and defaulting on its debts to Europe”
(Ahamed, 2009, pp. 125–129).
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Still, one can imagine there are some instances in which
people who operate businesses will want regulation—for, instance,
wanting banks to be regulated to avoid monetary stability, or
perhaps, they might want to avoid a “race to the bottom” that leads
to wages so low that overall demand is insufficient for business
expansion or a different “race to the bottom” that leads to negative
externalities and environmental degradation—in the day-to-day
operations of business oversight and regulation will appear as
obstacles to implementing needed decisions. This is the source
of an underlying dynamic tension that surfaces in policy, discourse, and ideological positioning.
Whether deliberation is considered a method of democratic-
will formation or a total theory of democratic society, it will rub
business the wrong way. Deliberation is time-consuming and has
to consider all interests; on a deliberative account, identifying
interests is not as simple and unproblematic as is commonly
supposed and “the formation of a point of view arises from the give
and take of reasons [as opposed] to merely ranking preferences.”19
The impact of profit-seeking enterprises, in contrast, is largely
actuated by advancing a particular set of interests that are likely to
conflict with other sets of interests.
As noted previously, Dewey offered two explanations for “the
devotion of democracy to education.” First, there is a superficial
one that popular suffrage depends upon an educated population.
Second, there is a deeper one that goes beyond merely repudiating
the principle of external authority:
There is a deeper explanation. A democracy is more than a form of
government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint
communicated experience. [Of the] individuals who participate in an
interest . . . each has to refer his own action to that of others, and to
consider the action of others to give point and direction to his own,
[which] is equivalent to the breaking down of those barriers of class,
race, and national territory which kept men from perceiving the full
import of their activity.

Dewey also contrasted this to “a group which in its exclusiveness
shuts out many interests” (Dewey 1916/1997, p. 91–92).
Democracy in his view fundamentally concerns “the realization of a form of social life in which interests are mutually interpenetrating, and where progress, or readjustment, is an important
consideration” (Dewey 1916/1997, p. 91–92).
For Dewey, to “participate in an interest” is more than a
transaction—it is a transformative experience, sharply distinct
from merely following an interest. Varied points of shared common
interest elevate the recognition of mutual interests to the level of
the socially inviolate; principles of diversity are emphasized as freer
interaction between social groups makes change in social habit
imperative. Thus, there is an antagonism between, on the one side,
the particularistic interests that drive business practice and its
aggregated outcomes and, on the other, the communicated
19 The distinction between will formation or a total theory and the
quoted phrase comes from personal communications by email with
Christopher Martin. While I think they were helpful and insightful, I
am not sure he would hold to those views or the precise phrasing.
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experience that arises out of deliberation on shared, overlapping,
and sometimes conflicting interests.
This is not to deny that there is a general business interest, but
the motive force comes from a set of parallel particularistic
interests—a group of enterprises that are seeking to make hay
while the sun shines and arguing that the sun should be allowed to
shine into the heretofore closed corners of the public system. The
general business interest, as it coalesces in leading ideologies,
emphasizes how the market solves problems and that the solution
lies in creating entrepreneurial opportunities. At the strategic
level—at least as embodied in the phrase “creative destruction”—
the chief method of solving problems is to destroy or dismantle
first, allowing others to repair or create later.
Whether we conceive of interests as particularistic or deliberative is important in that the question we are looking at is how
business influences those with direct authority over education. On
the one hand, the general public can come to decisions that are
influenced by market forces and ideologies. On the other, the three
specific sources of authority in education are affected by how
questions are framed in public discourse and how they are
advanced by the ideological apparatus of the private sector, ranging
from think tanks and media to foundations and funding
organizations (apropos of this, see Carey, 1997).
The crucial factor need not be some sort of shadowy coordination of efforts. While this is hardly absent, the main impetus is
that there is money to be made, and this draws people in. Narratives incorporating this dynamic motivator have been bandied
about since at least the 1990s, such as when former Massachusetts
Governor William Weld told us “the fundamentals are all aligned
for a great number of people to make a whole lot of money in this
sector” (Walsh, 2000, p. 13).
Significantly, Weld finished his statement, “and do well by
doing good.” More significant was the occasion of the statement—
a conference in New York “for investors, policy analysts, and others
interested in the growing business of education.” For those holding
to conspiracy theories, the conference was cosponsored by Wall
Street financier Theodore Forstmann, cofounder of the Children’s
Scholarship Fund, who gave this ideological thumbnail: “A
monopoly produces a bad product at a high price, and the education monopoly in America is no exception to that rule” (Walsh,
2000, p. 13). Thus, there is a clear perspective, one that identifies
monopoly with government, not business, and it often makes
reference to the justification of privatization in the form of school
vouchers that was suggested by Milton Friedman as long ago as
1955 (see McEwan & Carnoy, 2000, pp. 213–239).20 In addition to
vouchers, other propositions, such as pay-for-performance (aka
“merit” pay) and charters (a second choice for voucher supporters
but with support from those such as Joe Nathan, who think
charters an avenue for school innovation and differentiation), are
part of a single multistranded discourse that has both a constructive and a destructive (as in “creative destruction”) aspect.

20 Interestingly enough, it has been pursued most vigorously in the
country most dedicated to Friedman, Chile.
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The flip side is that many commentators on the right descry
the unions as producer organizations with anticompetitive
policies. The unions are rent seekers, they say, a remnant of
socialist and collectivist efforts that must be eliminated. Teachers
must be like just about everyone else—workers who can be fired at
will or nearly so. Lieberman (1993, pp. 47–53), in the forthrightly
named Public Education: An Autopsy,21 was one of the first to do so.
Others in favor of market-based reforms, such as Chubb and
Moe, specifically identify “The Root of the Problem” as democratic
control of schools. In that first chapter of their book, they argued
that schools are “open systems” and respond to their environments,
and when that environment is democratic, they do so negatively.
Since they are democratically controlled entities, schools respond
to constituents, not consumers; that means parents, making
choices for their children, have no greater voice than anyone else in
the community (Chubb & Moe, 1990).
Arguing that parents should have a greater voice is a normative point—one can argue that as education changes and shapes
society, then everyone should have a voice. In addition to its
normative basis, it is also in part a reaction to government control
of schools that is seen as centralized, bureaucratic, and ineffective
(for a critique of this second point, see S. R. Glass, 1997).22 Overall,
Chubb and Moe hold that democracy is essentially coercive, but
that markets, because they are decentralized, allow parents and
students the freedom to act as consumers, not as constituents,
where they will have a more powerful role.
Beyond that, since they believe that bureaucracy imposed by
democratic principles vitiates the most basic requirements of
effective organization, Chubb and Moe promoted organizational
autonomy and school-based management, including autonomy of
principals and teachers. They claimed that school governance is the
key variable, “that excessive bureaucracy is the proximate cause of
problems in the schools, and that politics are the ultimate cause
21 A case study of Lieberman, as someone who seems to be a “true
believer” advocate, might be in order. He once ran unsuccessfully
for the presidency of the American Federation of Teachers (AFT), but
the theme that he developed over time was acute criticism of teacher
unions—the AFT and the National Education Association (NEA)—for
standing in the way of needed improvement in our schools, arguing that
“the teacher unions are in the business to achieve more, not less, favorable terms and conditions of employment for teachers.” Other works by
Lieberman include The Impact of the Taylor Act upon the Governance and
Administration of Elementary and Secondary Education (1971), City University of New York; Beyond Public Education (1986), Praeger Publisher
Division of Greenwood Press; The Teachers’ Unions: How the NEA and
the AFT Sabotage Reform and Hold Students, Parents, Teachers and Taxpayers Hostage to Bureaucracy (1997), The Free Press; Encounter Books;
and Teachers Evaluating Teachers: Peer Review and the New Unionism
(1998), Transaction Publishers.
22 Based on extensive interviews, S. R. Glass (1997) “challenge[s] oversimplified assertions that differences of any importance exist between
the autonomy experienced by professionals in public and private high
schools . . . and challenges the myth that teachers and principals in private schools enjoy autonomy and freedom from democratic bureaucracy
that their public school counterparts do not” (p. 1).
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of the over-reliance on [a] bureaucracy [that] cannot be changed
unless the underlying political structure is changed” and “therefore
recommend that the present system of public school governance be
scrapped in favor of a market-driven one in which parents have
primary control over the schools” (G. V. Glass & Matthews, 1991,
pp. 24–27).
Chubb and Moe further emphasized not only that organizational autonomy is related to high achievement but that differences
in student achievement are due to differences in organizational
autonomy.23 So they welcomed the autonomy that the market
supposedly brings but also indicated that autonomy requires a
reworking of labor relations.
But what if Chubb and Moe are wrong? What if student
achievement is a result of, for instance, high-quality parent
involvement? Then the direction of causality would be something
like (1) parent involvement, (2) high student achievement,
(3) bureaucracies see no need to intervene, and, therefore,
(4) school autonomy is a result of other factors. The fact of school
autonomy would then be an epiphenomenon caused by the quality
of parental involvement, and efforts to increase school autonomy
might then be misguided. In this regard, it is important—at least as
an illustration—to consider charter schools as a type of
intervention, especially as they are concentrated in areas of lower
achievement and greater poverty. Poor performance, somehow
measured, becomes an invitation for intervention and, as it turns
out, intervention of a particular type.24
We need to see this in context. Whatever the form of governance, that still leaves the question of whether administrators or
classroom teachers have the most influence. It is not only that
autonomy requires a reworking of labor relations but that it needs a
reworking of labor relations with enormous consequences. In a
market system—for that is the context—you have to think that in
most cases the boss is the boss and teacher autonomy is not likely
to be robust. Here, the business logics tend to converge on the
23 The direction of causality is not certain, however. While Chubb
and Moe claimed they both established a correlation, their argument
that it is autonomy that leads to achievement is hardly solid. It
could be the other way around, that autonomy follows achievement,
that is, that schools with higher-achieving students may be granted
more freedom, and those with lower achieving students may invite more
interventions in their operations. Chubb and Moe both admitted this as
a possibility—“organization may be both cause and effect”—and then
somewhat unconvincingly dismissed it:
Despite all we have said about the problem of reciprocal causality, we believe that the key influences on student achievement
tend to run in one direction. We believe that school control
affects school organization more than the other way around,
and that school organization is primarily a cause of student
achievement and not a result of it. (Chubb & Moe, 1990,
pp. 113, 114)
For the original of this analysis, see G. V. Glass & Matthews, 1991,
pp. 24–27.
24 For a list of recommendations for other types of intervention, see
Morsy and Rothstein, 2015.
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issues of public-versus-private enterprise and collective
bargaining.
While not necessarily its most representative example, Chubb
and Moe (1990) are still part of a pattern in which poor
performance in a small subset of schools is used to justify a massive
change. While their school autonomy model seems to be at odds
with an accountability regime based on an extensive system of
tests, data collection, and accountability, they can be mutually
reenforcing. The metric by which schools are judged to be performing well or not is largely determined by the accountability
regime; even if it shared by the public and private sectors, there is
also a bureaucracy, a newly shaped one with different goals and
measures. The goals are less about equity, more about achievement
and performance; the measures are the metrics by which we gauge
achievement and performance. As Slavin (1999) noted, since the
early 1980s school reform has been constant and “the main focus of
reform has been on school governance and [emphasis added]
accountability” (p. 325).
Yes, there is a pattern: first, point out “poor performance” and
argue that the public system does not work; second, draw off some
funding from public enterprise; third, make funds available to
private-sector entities with projects that will remake the public
system and purportedly solve its problems. And there are
coordinated efforts, such as attacking school performance,
insisting on “accountability,” instituting regularly administrated
standardized tests, changing curricula and standards, and altering
evaluation methods. Still, it is not the coordination of one single
unified campaign that leads to the discounting of the liberal values
of democratic education but the aggregation of many smaller
efforts that see those values as obstacles.
What gives the movement much of its force is that, in countless instances, the business outcome has priority over democratic
imperatives. This is the common sense of business, and it emanates
from people engaged in largely parallel efforts. Market-based
systems succeed because they benefit people—at least those people
who successfully navigate the market. A significant portion
involves clever young men (and some women) pursing
opportunities to dismantle the public sector or peel certain parts
away, thus allowing for-profit entities to enter the field. And if the
democratic goals of education get in the way of that, then let’s just
not pay attention to them.25
25 This is directly related to the decline of civics education. As regards
this, we will not go into it in any depth, but it is a well-worn topic, and
multiple authors have descried the decline of civics education. Some
recent examples:
• “Civic knowledge and public engagement is at an all-time
low” (Shapiro & C. Brown, 2018).
• After the 1960s, “civics offerings were slashed as the
curriculum narrowed over the ensuing decades, and lost
further ground to ‘core subjects’ under the NCLB-era
standardized testing regime” (Litvinov, 2017).
• “For at least half a century America’s schools have
systematically failed to prepare students to be capable
citizens” (Rebell, 2018).
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Neoliberal Ideology, The Public Will, and Organized Opposition
The task of creating a public will for a unified public school system
is daunting. It is even more so when there is organized opposition.
And there is.
Without invoking some level of organized opposition, one
cannot accurately frame many of these business interventions.
There are reform movements that promote market-based models
of education and/or reform efforts centered on the emulation of
market mechanism. This is not only in the United States—Pasi
Sahlberg, former director general of Finland’s CIMO (of the
Ministry of Education and Culture) in Helsinki, has termed it
the Global Education Reform Movement (GERM).
Nonetheless, I am emphasizing ideas over organization
because these interventions gain traction more readily if there is a
shared set of beliefs—such as “the common sense of business”
referred to previously—and if there are numerous, parallel sources.
This is evident in U.S. public education, where market-emulation
models seek to divert efforts to create a unified public school
system and substitute in its place a patchwork of charters, vouchers
for private schools, online education, home schooling, virtual
schools, and public schools based on market emulation models.26
These are all separate economic opportunities and have somewhat
different motivating forces, but they share some significant
common features.
Education reform largely based on market-driven economic
forces is a global phenomenon and should be considered as part of
a neoliberal movement that can be dated back to the late 1960s and
the 1970s.27 Neoliberalism holds generally that poor economic
performance is due to state interference in the market mechanism.
Amounting to a type of market fundamentalism, neoliberalism
seeks to change the relationships between state and society; four

• “We need to ask whether schools are equipping students
with the tools to become engaged, informed, and
compassionate citizens” (Hansen et al., 2018).
• “There is abundant evidence of an abysmally low level
of understanding of the constitution, our system of
government, and American history in general. . . . Many
Americans profess, or at least did when the question
was asked in surveys from 1968 through 2000 that
the ‘civic mission of schools is an essential—if not the
essential—purpose of education.’ The centrality of a civic
mission appears dubious in light of the recent focus on
training and testing in STEM courses” (Folz & Dodd,
2014).
See also Ward, 2014.
26 For the purposes of this article, I will not attempt to establish this but
will take it as a given. The literature on this is immense; for a review of
much of it, emphasizing the misuse of statistics and quantitative studies,
see Ford, 2012. Other sources are in other footnotes.
27 The term “neoliberalism” was, however, coined long before, by
economists and legal scholars affiliated with the Freiberg School of the
University of Freiberg in Baden-Württemberg, Germany, in the interwar
period (Steger & Roy, 2010, p. ix).
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relevant features are privatization, financialization, management
and manipulation of crisis, and state redistributions.28
Increased corporate power, commodification, and privatization are, according to Harvey (2006), and many others, part of the
neoliberal project. Thus, privatization, in whole or in part, is
applied to public institutions (ranging from prisons to universities)
and public utilities (such as water, electricity, and transportation);
it has even changed the structure of warfare through the use of
private contractors. In the U.S., regulations on telecommunications
have been largely removed, and social welfare provisions (such as
housing, health care, pensions) have been reformed in accordance
with market models.
Neoliberal ideology . . . aligns the concept of free markets with
individual freedom, laissez fare, and the individual entrepreneur with
classical liberalism [and then] goes beyond classical liberalism by
embracing market fundamentalism since it is believed in neoliberal
ideology that society is a market where “every human being is an
entrepreneur managing their own life, and should act as such.” (Kabir,
2013, quoting Treanor, 2005, as cited in Prechel & Harms, 2007, p. 4)

Applying such a view to education would obviously have a huge
impact, emphasizing not the student as a deliberative political
citizen but as a multifaceted economic agent—worker, investor,
and consumer.
The political aspect of neoliberalism is drawn primarily from
Hayek and Friedman, both of whom argued for individual
economic freedom that would, by extension, also apply to businesses, including corporations, functioning in the market.
(Whether Smith [1776], given his fears regarding “conspiracies
against the public and contrivances to raise prices” [book I,
chapter X] and having little experience with corporations, would
agree is an open question.) In a neoliberal policy agenda, market-
driven economic forces are the key factor in determining the goals
of the education system, emphasizing how each student must
become an economic entity, either by getting a job or by starting a
business. Students, while they are still biding their time in school,
are considered to be consumers, buying a product that will enable
their economic futures.
One thing left out is the production of citizens or, if you will,
deliberative democrats. This was Gutmann’s topic, and by looking
at her three sources of authority—the state, parents, and
educational professionals—we see how this movement has worked.
In order to examine these models, we will use Gutmann’s work as a
heuristic device to interpret business-influenced movements to
reform public education. This involves the fit between the infusion
of ideology “from above,” so to speak, and the strategies of business
built from the ground up.

Proxies for Children, a Purported Insight, and Changed
Questions: Agendas, Authority, and Influence
Why should not the business community also be considered a
source of authority?
28 The list comes from Harvey, 2006. See also Prechel and Harms, 2007,
pp. 3–17. For the manipulation of crisis, see Klein, 2007.
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First, a bit more personal background. This paper is an
elaboration of an insight, and I think it is worth going into the
background. In 2012, when I was living in India, I reviewed galleys
for my soon-to-be published book on U.S. education, the subtitle
of which fairly describes its theme, The Rhetoric Gap and How
Research on Schools has Laid the Ground for New Business Models in
Education. The draft had been finished while I was still in the U.S.,
but after the proofs came out, I had a chance to made final changes.
One proposed addition was a thought I had about Gutmann’s
work, particularly the three sources of authority she posited for
education: the state, parents, and educational professionals. Why, I
thought at the time, should the business community, which had
great influence, not also be considered a source of authority?
Certainly, much of what was embedded in new education reform
proposals were based on an economistic common sense. Such were
the underlying principles of a neoliberal reform: Competition
is the way to efficiency; successful schools would multiply while
failing schools should be closed down; business practices can be
imported into the education system to great effect; an entrepreneurial ethos can guide the system’s development.
I wrote a few paragraphs, but they were not included in the
book since they went beyond the 5% that, by contract, I was
allowed to add. (In this case, the marketplace of ideas was limited
by marketing concerns.) Still, the question remained as how
business had as much influence as it did when it did not have direct
authority.
I want to stress that it is the latter question I am exploring.
I am not asking why Gutmann (1987) did not include business
influence in her work. Some readers of earlier versions have
suggested that I sought “to demolish” Gutmann, but that was by no
means the point. It seems fairly clear why business would not have
been included in Gutmann’s work as a source of authority. First,
business is from a different sphere and does not have a custodial
relation with children. Second, business influence was not nearly as
great as it later became.
Yes, Gutmann’s (1987) work could certainly be seen in a much
different light—perhaps many different lights—because of how
education reform has unfolded since she wrote the book in
the 1980s. Neoliberalism and business influence do change the
problematic, and it might very well be that the relationship
between democracy and education has to be rethought in an era in
which technology has enabled a new type of globalization that has
the potential to undercut democratic efforts at the national level.
While it would have to engage with the question I am posing, that
sort of reworking of the theory of democratic education—a
reevaluation of its underpinnings under changed
circumstances—is a task that is beyond me.
Rather, this piece seeks to answer another question: How have
business and investor classes achieved a large measure of success in
advancing their agenda in education? How can we track their
influence? They answer to that is, of course, partly to be had from
identifying and tracking their superior resources, but even that has
not given them direct authority over education. Instead, what
business-influenced education reform has done to gain influence is
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to change the questions that the three sources of authority seek to
answer.
For the state, educational purpose has narrowed, and political
citizenship has changed to economic competency. The question
has changed from “how to create proper democratic citizens who
can someday participate in national deliberations?” to “how to
serve customers so they can some day navigate the changing eddies
and currents of the global market?”
For parents, they have been co-opted; rather than partners in
developing and maintaining educational institutions, they have
become consumers. Their question has changed from “how to
contribute to a collective effort to build a fair, equitable, and
high-quality school system?” to “how do I make the best choice for
my child among the educational options laid before them by a
system based on choice?”
For educators, they have been marginalized and subjected to
attack. The question has changed from “how can I seek out from
administrators what I need to enable me to teach?” to “how can I
avoid being blamed for the failures that the system is now intent on
spotlighting?”
Continuing with Gutmann’s (1987) sources of authority, all
three serve as proxies for children in different ways. Proxies are
needed for children because of their age and their stage of cognitive, emotional, intellectual, and political development; they are
not thought capable of making informed choices (C. Martin, 2018).
This depiction of competing proxies does a lot to explain educational discourse by looking at the three groups that at some point
have custody over or a compelling interest in the welfare of the
child—the parents (in general), the school (in locus parentis), and
the state (in extreme conditions enforcing community and legal
standards).
These three sources balance and check each other in different
and important ways. First, the state seeks to shape individuals so as
to serve state purposes—in war, agriculture, industry, technology,
governance, etc. It may also seek to fulfill an ideological vision of
what a society should be and how individuals would be accordingly shaped by the educational system. This might be deemed
the ethical content of the state—ideas that vary according to the
cultural specificities of a particular state and society. In using this
as its justification, the state can call on parents and educators to
comply with established norms.
Second, similarly, parents often work to impart ethical
content and to transmit cultural traditions, to leave a legacy of their
own, and to have a sense of satisfaction in seeing their children
become independent adults. As participants in discourse and
voting, they have an impact on who state actors are and what state
actors can deem legitimate. Third, those who actually engage in
education out of the home, as their profession, their calling, or
both, draw on both theory and practice to make the claim that they
know—or at least have a more informed perception of—what
is best for the child and for the future individual the child will
become. Plus, whatever the theory and directives for education
are, they must be implemented, and it is educators who will
implement them.
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Accordingly, all three may be proxies for children. Since
children do have limited capacities when compared to adults, the
argument is that they would likely benefit from having a proxy who
is both honest and insightful. That does not mean, however, that
the proxies don’t have their own agendas or that trustees or proxies
can be trusted fully. While it is an issue that cannot be considered
fully here, we ought to remember there are two meanings to
trust—one based on intent, the other on capacity. I may trust my
brother with my life, but I won’t have him fix my roof since he does
not know the first thing about construction or carpentry. Good
intentions or not, the roof is likely to fall in.29
Still, by looking at the conflicts between these three sources of
authority, one can do a lot. Gutmann (1987), as a theoretical
project, argued that none of them are sufficient unto themselves;
thus, a democracy and the system of democratic education on
which it relies must achieve a balance among the three. In practical
and empirical terms, one can look at how issues arise from one
source of authority or another and how actors in the three spheres
interact to explain outcomes on policy issues ranging from school
funding to sex education to prayer in schools.
What the depiction of three sources of authority does not do,
however, is explain the rise of one of the most powerful influencers
of education reform over the last four decades: business. Business
influence differs in many ways from the three sources listed
previously, but in particular it differs in that it has not normally
been thought to have direct authority over education. Unlike the
other three, business is not usually a custodial actor, the rare
exceptions being in those cases where schools are run as for-profit
entities, and these only account for a very small percentage of
minor students in K–12 settings.
Just as it does not have direct custody, business has a different
conception of trust. In The Logic and Limits of Trust (1983), Barber
spoke of how business espouses and wants others to embrace “the
indirect road.” He described it as follows:

29 The discussion on “trusting in intent” versus “trusting in
capacity” hardly ends there, either.
On the issue of intent, it is not clear that people would take their
trustee role seriously. After all, they might just feel that now they have
two votes, and it is thus open to misuse. It is hardly clear even in the case
of parents that they would treat this proxy vote differently from their
own—a proxy should be concerned with the interests of the individual
for whom they are proxies.
Even more vexing is the issue of capacity: Could the trustee proxies
actually know the preferences of those whose votes they hold in trust?
Could they be able to predict which vote will lead to the greatest good for
those whose votes they hold in trust?
Overall, we have two worries: How seriously do they take their own
role as a proxy voter? How informed are they? In a brief argument, we
can draw on the work of Bernard Barber (1983) on trust. Barber treats
trust as a complex notion in which expectations of future performance
vie with beliefs in good intentions. Accordingly, I argue elsewhere that
one way of describing the paradigm shift in education is to say there has
been a shift in the mode of trust from models based on family, political,
and philanthropic spheres to a model based on business interactions.
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Social control over service to the public welfare is assigned not to
public expectations of direct fiduciary obligations and their
fulfillment, but to the indirect competitive mechanisms of the market.
That is, the profit incentive, operating through the market, will ensure
indirectly that businesses effectively serve the public good. (Barber,
p. 101)

Moreover, while the state, parents, and educators all have
agendas of their own, they are thought secondary to their interests
in the well-being of the student. Perhaps this is an optimistic view,
but they nonetheless contrast with the profit-seeking motives of
those engaged in business; these are primary, and their agenda is
more obvious. While a parent’s agenda might be to want a child to
be educated to make the parent’s life easier, to advance their own
careers, or to make their life more secure (for instance, by doing
tasks around the home, by working in a family business or on a
family farm, or by eventually taking care of aged parents), there are
limits on this, limits, for instance, that educators would articulate
and that the state might impose if a child was taken out of school.30
Similarly, if educators are self-interested, parents and the state
could potentially step in; indeed, such accusations have been a
prominent way of attacking teachers and teachers unions, claiming
they do not put “children first.” Finally, if the state inculcated
a culture that was directed only to the state’s interests, such as a
military culture, this would generally (with perhaps the exceptions
of ancient Sparta and Plato’s imagined Republic) result in at least
some resistance from parents and educators; most parents do not
want their children to be cannon fodder, and many educators have
qualms about recommending their students enter the military.
Gutmann (1987) discussed why all three sources are insufficient by themselves early in the book; without looking at self-
interested agendas, she found them wanting nonetheless. None of
these can stand alone. The family state is unacceptable because it
forbids parents from influencing their children’s upbringing. The
state of families is unacceptable because children need some liberty
vis-à-vis their parents. The state of individuals is unacceptable
because it keeps us from teaching virtues or inculcating children
with visions of the good life (pp. 26–37).
Business, however, is of questionable standing for multiple
reasons. Business cannot operate without profits or “margins” (at
least not for long). Traditionally, it does not have direct authority
over children. In some schemas, businesses are in a different sphere
altogether—not the sphere of reproduction but instead the sphere
30 For a few years I was one of the managers of a residence for
developmentally challenged adults in the Boston area. One of the
residents, I will call her Tessa, was taken out of school after the fifth
grade and kept at home in order to do cleaning and cooking. While Tessa
was certainly challenged to some degree, my opinion was that if she had
the opportunity to get an education, she would have been able to lead a
life much like anyone else’s. While I don’t imagine that special education
programs were robust at the time, and that may well have contributed
to her parent’s decision, Tessa was more challenged emotionally than
cognitively; her absence from school, lack of rudimentary skills, and lack
of socialization were the greater factors leading to her need to be in a
supported setting.
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of production.31 Nonetheless, business has effects—it channels
liberty into a particular vision of the good life; it affects how
parents influence their children; it treats educators as instruments.
While business does not have direct authority over education,
the indirect influence of business and investor classes has been
enormous, making the question of how to track it quite pressing.
One way is to, in the well-worn phrase, follow the money.32 Yes,
businesses can and do lobby government; businesses can start and
have started chains of private or charter schools. Also, businesses
can and do produce educational products, ranging from textbooks
and curricula to data systems, standardized tests, and computer-
assisted instruction; businesses can and do enter into public
discourse; businesses can and do start foundations and give money
to educational institutions; and businesses can and do support
educational alternatives, but they affect the project of public education
indirectly.
Another way, which does not preclude the first, is to focus on
the sources of authority in education and how they are influenced.
Businesses are not one of the three primary sources of authority
and traditionally do not exercise authority directly. Rather, they
have a secondary authority or what may be thought of as a mediated influence. Each of the three primary sources of authority is
influenced indirectly by framing the question of how to provide
public education in a particular way so as to redirect one of the
primary sources.
Three core examples are the standards movement, school
choice, and attacks on educators. These illustrate a paradigm
change in the provision of education. First, we have the standards
movement (which morphed into the Common Core) seeking to
redirect state attention from the civic components of education
to the “rigor” of core academic subjects (especially mathematics,
English language, and scientific technical subjects), which include
the key skills needed by business, leaving the “richness” of art,
music, and literature in the second string.
Second, we have an accompanying shift from considering
students as future citizens to considering them contemporary
consumers and future workers or entrepreneurs. The first takes the
form of school choice, in which parental authority is redirected
from the provision of public education to the selection among
different existing public education and publicly funded education
options. Along with this is a switch from considering students as
participants in democracy to preparing them primarily for
economic roles; citizenship becomes, primarily, economic
citizenship.

31 The state also may be said to be in a different and third sphere—the
sphere of coercion, since it controls the legitimate means of coercion.
However, that is not its only function, and it is also in most cases the
leading apparatus through which a human community implements
collective decisions, including establishing a school system.
32 One often follows the money through foundations, such as the Bill
and Melinda Gates Foundation, the Walton Family Foundation, and the
Broad Foundation. See Reckhow, 2012. See also Ravitch, 2010. If I recall
correctly, she also uses the phrase “follow the money.”
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Finally, and related to this, there are direct attacks on the
quality and motives of professional educators, attacking “bad”
teachers as the cause of educational failures and attacking teachers
unions as distributional coalitions that protect the incompetent;
accompanying this has been a change in teacher evaluation,
including using standardized tests to gauge the effectiveness of
teachers and introducing new rubrics for observation in the
classroom.33
I will try to unpack that sometime, but it is important to note
that there is a common element linking all three: testing. Tests are
not the only factor, but they were at the core of the model of
standardized tests and a system of data collection. Testing is how
we determine if children meet their standards. Testing is how we
assess school success and failure and which schools stay open and
which ones close. Testing is how teachers are evaluated—do they
increase their students’ scores?—how teachers might earn “merit
pay,” and how teachers are promoted or fired.

Contrasting Perspectives on Testing Regimes, Productivity,
and Creativity
If we accept that there has been a paradigm change—or at least a
contestation of how the paradigm should change—we should start
with testing.34 Testing is central to contemporary education reform
in the same way caffeine is central to choosing among types of
coffee. There are different views on how testing should be used just
as people differ over how much of a jolt their coffee should give
them. There are those who advocate testing as the essential element
33 Henry Giroux (2012), Ken Saltman (2012), Diane Ravitch (2010),
Alex Means (2013), Richard Rothstein (2010a, 2010b), and many others
have highlighted attacks on teachers as central to the educational reforms
promoted and financed by the mega wealthy, such as Bill Gates, Rupert
Murdoch, and Eli Broad. These reforms promote privatization, charters,
online classes, and high-stakes testing, but the flip side of this is deprofessionalization. Teacher autonomy is reduced or eliminated; teacher
training is thought unimportant; teachers unions are denigrated as mere
distributional coalitions, at the same time impugning the character and
the unions that support them.
34 While this paper considers the neoliberal period, from the mid-
1970s (or even the late 1960s) to the present, with special emphasis on
the use of standardized testing beginning in the late 1980s and 1990s,
one might nevertheless easily connect this to the arguments between
pedagogical and administrative progressives from the 1920s onward.
The latter “sought to apply a top-down model where expert bureaucrats
ran schools seeking social and economic efficiency [with] a primary
focus on organizational performance and aggressive ‘uniform’ goals
(high-stakes tests, evaluation rubrics, and standards),” while the former
pursued “student-centered learning approaches” informed by theories of
cognitive development. For a brief summary with exciting illustrations,
see the source of the quotes, Heilig, 2013. I would note, however,
that there are significant differences, especially in that administrative
progressives followed a statist model, not a market-emulation
model. That is to say, they were concerned with organizational issues
and operations protocols, not entrepreneurial ethos and market
emulation—it was a different species of capitalism. Moreover, many
advocates of charters (e.g., J. Nathan) have strong arguments to make on
pedagogical, organizational culture, and developmentalist grounds.
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in an accountability regime, and those who worry that testing takes
away from higher educational aims.
No one disputes, however, that beginning in the 1980s, there
was an effort to evaluate educational outcomes by using
standardized tests.35 The watchword was accountability. According
to Klees (2014), “the emphasis was on narrow views of efficiency
more than equity, implemented through narrow versions of
accountability focused on testing and measurement.” This was in
sharp contrast with “the 1960s and 1970s, [when] there was
attention focused on the inequities and inequalities of education,
the marginalization of many people around the world, and the
need for substantially more resources to be devoted to all levels of
education.” He compared this with the post-1980s period when
neoliberalism became ascendant and “led to a sea change in
discourse and policy. . . Basic problems of public schools have been
ignored; instead, policies promoted market solutions through
private schools, vouchers, charters, and the like” (pp. 13).
There was also activity from government agencies, foundations, and universities. The University of Pittsburgh, for instance,
started a New Standards Project™ in which the phrase “New
Standards™” was trademarked (Ford, 2012, p. xxxi). While no single
set of national tests was ever created, almost every state had
statewide, high-stakes tests by the end of the 1990s, and this was
encouraged at the federal level. After 2002, the George W. Bush
administration formalized this leverage with the No Child Left
Behind (NCLB) program. NCLB called for annual testing of all
students in English language (but not so much literature) and math
from grades three through eight, with plans for expansion to
science and to other grade levels.
While the expansion plans were never met and the Obama
administration rolled back some aspects of NCLB, one must note
that support for testing was bipartisan. Then Senator Edward
Kennedy was key to getting NCLB passed in 2002. Also, despite
referring to NCLB as broken, Obama Secretary of Education
Arne Duncan used the law as a leveraging instrument, giving states
waivers to NCLB only after they agreed to implement some pet
policies, such as creating more charter schools (thus expanding
school choice) and using student test scores in teacher
evaluations.36
Perhaps the most prevalent bipartisan element is what seems
to be the underlying theme of the neoliberal era: Schools are
failures, and it is the fault of teachers. Illustrative is the NCLB
35 As I argue in Social Learning and Hegemony, data technologies made
this qualitatively different than other such attempts, but it was hardly
the first time testing in the U.S. was controversial. See Kaestle, 2012;
Reese, 2013; and Gould, 1981.
36 In 2015, Duncan said NCLB “has long been broken. We can no longer
afford that law’s one-size-fits-all approach, uneven standards, and low
expectations for our educational system” (Miller, 2015).
Prior to that, he had, however, used the waiver process to require
states to create more privately managed charter schools and to tie measures of student growth to teacher evaluations. See for instance, Brill,
2011, pp. 227–233; Derthick and Rotherham, 2012; Ravitch, 2012; and
Emma, 2013.
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system of deeming schools “failing” and then closing them down if
they did not sufficiently improve. Also prominent is Democrats for
Education Reform (DFER), a New York–based political action
committee with its roots in “the data-driven business community”
(Maranto & McShane, 2012). DFER promotes use of more charter
schools, alternative school funding, an end to tenure, stricter
teacher evaluations, standardized testing, and the Common Core
educational standards. It has been highly influential, and it has
been posited that Duncan’s elevation to secretary of education over
Linda Darling-Hammond, Obama’s education transition chief, was
indicative of their influence.37
Public asset privatization and the importation of business
practices were normalized during the Obama presidency. Calling
“reform” a misnomer, Ravitch (2013) argued both that the “corporate reform movement,” with its close ties to the Obama administration, in fact “has its roots in an ideology that is antagonistic to
public education” and that “the advocates for this cause seek not to
reform public education but to transform it into an entrepreneurial
sector of the economy” (p. 20, p. 19).
There were certain efforts to raise caps on the number of
charter schools. Janelle Scott has identified an “emerging charter
school policy-planning network” in which the “federal Department of Education, state legislatures, and philanthropies and
private foundations have facilitated much of the growth of charter
schools in urban school districts through their investment in
charter school management organizations (CMOs) and through
their investments in sundry advocacy organizations” (Scott, 2015,
p. 132).38
Perhaps more important, large sums of money were dedicated to building data systems to keep track of test scores, to link
teachers to their students’ test results, and to fund merit pay
programs based on that link (Ravitch, 2010, p. 183). Duncan’s chief
of staff, Joanne Weiss, laid out for the readers of the Harvard
37 During the Bush-to-Obama transition, Darling-Hammond was
considered the principal adviser to the Obama transition team.
Nonetheless, Duncan, who had long known President Obama both
in Chicago and on the basketball court, was chosen as secretary
of education. But it wasn’t just their personal association; DFER
founders—Whitney Tilson, Boykin Curry, and John Petry, all hedge fund
“value investors”—recommended Duncan (Brill, 2011, pp. 223–225).
This was of major significance: Darling-Hammond was a great
proponent of an institution building model, while, according to Giroux
and Saltman (2008), Duncan saw that neoliberal methods had a place
in the real worlds of political and economic competition; with Arne
Duncan, they said, “neoliberal ideology is on full display in the various
connections he has established with the ruling political and business
elite.” While Darling-Hammond was a strong advocate of building up
a highly qualified teaching force (for her viewpoints on teachers, see
Darling-Hammond, “Teacher Quality and Student Achievement,” as
cited in J. K. Rice, 2003, pp. 2–3), Duncan used elements of market
emulation models, including new evaluation systems for teachers, that,
while calling NCLB “broken,” built on both its underlying principles and
its methods, especially the use of leverage to get states to adopt U.S. DOE
reforms. See for instance, Bracey, 2009; Klein, Hoff, and Gewertz, 2008.
38 Scott referenced Zehr (2011).
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Business Review how “the market for education technology is likely
to accelerate” and entrepreneurs needed to be matched with school
systems, including enabling “data-driven culture in their schools
that depended on a formative assessment regimen” (Weiss, 2011).
Moreover, in February 2010, President Obama took a stand in
favor of closing low-performing schools that was straight from the
DFER playbook. He defended the firing of all 93 school employees
at Central Falls High School in Rhode Island because the school
had failed to measure up. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan
praised the courage of those who made the decision. Whatever
courage they displayed, they seemed to ignore that the majority of
school failures are in areas of concentrated poverty and that
student achievement is highly correlated to the educational
attainment and economic level of one’s parents (Ford, 2012, pp. 81,
100, 124; see also Goldstein, 2011).
Yes, there are direct actions, but for the most part, it can be
described as “the natural state” in a market system where people
and groups pursue their interests largely independently. Again, a
question that arises is whether this is somehow a plot—a grand
conspiracy. If we mean that the major players meet in smoke-filled
rooms, then the answer is again most likely no. If we mean that
the players talked with one another or read the same materials, the
answer is often yes. But that is not the main point. This is not meant
to be a criticism of conspiratorial business actions but of pervasive
business influence, and that influence comes not only from
foundations and individuals seeking to alter the system but in
largest part from the entrepreneurial opportunities offered by
opening up the system. Thus, when we look at these reforms, we
don’t have to preclude the presence of good intentions, but we do
have to understand that the dynamic forces come from the promise
of future profits:
Some sincerely believe they are helping poor black and brown children
escape from failing public schools. Some think they are on the side of
modernization and innovation . . . others see an opportunity to make
money in a large, risk-free, government-funded sector or an
opportunity for personal advancement and power. Some—a small but
important number—believe they are acting rationally by treating the
public education sector as an investment opportunity (Ravitch, 2013,
p. 20.).39

Business may seem to be a nonspecific term, but the vagueness disappears when we ask the question “What does one learn in
business school?” Though they have their effects, we are not talking
about the infusion of capitalist ideologies justifying the system as a
whole but rather the practices one must adopt to remain
39 Again, it is worth pointing out that ideological coalition formation
draws from groups with different beliefs who converge: true believers who firmly believe that research shows that we should adopt these
measures to improve the system; political actors who want to adopt
these positions for political advantage; and those who see the adoption
as advantaging them economically. This is, of course, just the crudest of
thumbnail sketches, but one important in understanding the formation
of ideological and strategic positions, where they come from, how they
develop, and how they interact over time.
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competitive. In other words, it is first about strategies—ideologies
are secondary. People in business internalize the principles and
practices that characterize a private market economy and can
justify their being applied to the pursuit of the public good.
Business approaches to education do dovetail with a privatization ideology, including the promotion of public-private partnerships, but still it is about strategy:
[I]deas from business and business leaders have been marketed as
important to the improvement of education . . . Sometimes this entire
business-oriented approach is subsumed under the heading of “new
public management.” . . . School district superintendents and
university presidents are now called chief executive officers, and too
often are selected with a business background instead of an education
one. And, most common, is that task forces and commissions on
education routinely give pride of place to business executives, as if
business strategies translate to education strategies. (Klees, 2014,
p. 144)40

We also see the increased use of terms that are business-
oriented, such as “best practices,” even if we cannot know that they
are really the best as opposed to being merely preferred by a select
group. “Best practices” are a mixed bag at best and can include, as I
can attest as a teacher who gets a lot of them, your assistant
supervisors sending out multiple group emails that cheerily begin,
“Hey, Team!”
Still, this is not a conspiracy; rather, it is something one should
expect. Just as a simple matter of backward planning, if someone
has an economistic perspective, then they are most likely interested
in efficiency, competition, and comparative advantage and,
consequently, would likely support as a public good a program that
produces strong-minded and capable economic actors who can
navigate the market.
Consider these contingencies:
First, if you had a list of imperatives for education that are
developed with the goal of allowing for some sort of
egalitarianism—at least in so much as a person’s talents would be
recognized and nurtured.
Second, if this list had been developed by looking at the
possible ways in which the pursuit of profits may produce undesirable social consequences, including the concentration of power,
and if this list also seeks to create a democratic citizen who
considers the general good, balancing it with their individual
interests.
Third, if education were thought of, at least in part, as a way of
balancing out the inequitable (economic, social, and perhaps even
natural inequities).
If you had all these things, then you would also expect to some
extent there would be a similar list, with content that was
40 Klees added, “This is ubiquitous and has given most educators a lot of
headaches. Primary, secondary, and higher education have suffered from
the call for business plans, strategic plans, performance budgets, right-
sizing, impact evaluation, merit pay, and the like. Evaluations of teachers
have multiplied, usually illegitimately tied to a few very narrow indicators.” (p. 144)
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diametrically opposed, derived from other interests and other
perspectives. The list might assume the lack of egalitarianism was
not a big problem, that the market would take care of that. It might
assume that the social consequences of ignoring the profit motive
are even more undesirable, that the concentration of power allows
for tough discretionary judgments, and that the appeal to the
consumer instead of to the citizen advances the interests of the
individual. It might highlight how education can select individuals
by merit and let them advance.
Business perspectives most often hold that we set the strong-
minded and capable economic actors who can navigate the market
in motion and watch them make change. Equity and social justice
would be secondary concerns. If, on the one hand, one has a
perspective that emphasizes democratic practice, one would
support a program that produces critical and creative
thinkers—capable democratic actors who, among other things,
might question the wisdom of constantly following the directions
in which the market and its incentives take us.
This is not to say these perspectives cannot share some goals.
While they may very well differ in terms of both social costs and
how to create a productive system, the two perspectives may
overlap in many regards, especially in terms of productivity in the
long run. Presumably creativity and critical thinking skills are
necessary for both. But, on the other hand, there are differences in
priority—for one perspective looks for the aggregate and the other
for the communal, or at least the mutually created.
One can argue that recent American education reform is
tinged with the irony that it might have been counterproductive,
even in economic terms (Ford, 2012, pp. 120–130).41 Since the 1980s,
reforms were meant to increase economic performance by
introducing higher standards and promoting accountability
through the instrument of a testing regime. The results are,
however, mixed at best—the “standards” movement in the 1980s
and how it then segued into the data-driven system of assessment
we have now are of questionable value, but they match fairly well
with business perspectives on how to train, select, and evaluate
employees. Of course, in public education, selection is a much
trickier issue, because we presumably do not want to exclude
students, but the business perspective still has its effects.
Moreover, business influence is driven by business opportunity. Weiss (2011) pointed out one example directly:
The development of common standards and shared assessments
radically alters the market for innovation in curriculum development,
professional development, and formative assessments. Previously,
these markets operated on a state-by-state basis, and often on a
district-by-district basis. But the adoption of common standards and
shared assessments means that education entrepreneurs will enjoy
national markets where the best products can be taken to scale.

There is a problem, however. By using the word
“entrepreneur,” Weiss (2011) might be drawing on an image of a
41 The following several paragraphs are a condensed version, without
including all the citations or nuances, of the argument in “Achieving
Creativity” of “Section H: Consider the Hero.”
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garage-incubated start-up or a mom-and-pop shop—and there are
some examples of those—but taking something to scale requires
huge resources. So, we end up with McGraw Hill or Pearson
Education, which labels itself “The world’s learning company.”
Pearson’s annual revenues tripled, from $2 billion in the early
2000s to roughly $6 billion in the 2014 fiscal year, and its
“increasing profits come, in no small part, from the company’s
continued influence over federal and global education initiatives
which has led to the wholesale adoption of Pearson’s products in
nearly every aspect of public education today” (see Attick & Boyles,
2016, pp. 5–19).
Meanwhile, the irony is that creativity among youth has
declined, and education reforms are all over the place. In some
places, drill-and-kill is adopted as much as problem-based
learning because the tests are standardized and the answers, many
believe, can be memorized, at least a lot of them (Kim, 2011). When
Jonathan Plucker, a U.S. creativity specialist, was asked while
visiting China to identify trends in American education,
he described the U.S. focus on standardized curriculum, rote
memorization, and nationalized testing. “After my answer was
translated, they just started laughing out loud. They said, ‘You’re
racing toward our old model. But we’re racing toward your model,
as fast as we can’” (quoted in Bronson & Merryman, 2010).42
However, while China moves elsewhere and the European
Union declared a European Year of Creativity and Innovation
(which involved “holding conferences on the neuroscience of
creativity, financing teacher training, and instituting problem-
based learning programs—curricula driven by real-world
inquiry—for both children and adults” [quoted in Bronson &
Merryman, 2010]), the U.S. has seemed bent on market model
reforms and standardized tests of basic skills, neither of which has
been shown to improve education anywhere else in the world.
However, outsourcing of assessment through the use of standardized tests fits right in with the market model, so we should not be
surprised that they go hand-in-hand.
Maybe it is more than irony but a central paradox: Efforts in
the U.S. over the last 30 years—the national attention on education
reform as a means to keep the U.S. from slipping in international
economic competition—seem to have resulted in a system that has
gotten worse at its core, in its philosophical tenets, and in its
ultimate effect on children and young adults, placing unwonted
pressure on them and stifling their creativity and stunting their
emotional lives. Arguably, it has also made the U.S. less competitive
economically.43
42 While I have great respect for Plucker, to what extent we are rushing
to rote memorization is contestable.
43 As noted, this is the summary of an argument I have made elsewhere.
Some advance readers have suggested it is polemical and unsupported.
While I admit it is both speculative and on the polemical side, it is
supported by reference to the literature on creativity as well as a logical
progression:
1) Creativity is an important ingredient in economic
advance;
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So, to some extent, one can see these two currents coming
closer together. Business, after all, is not one thing but many
activities requiring different skills. However, if we accept business
is nonetheless nearly unanimous in opposing government
programs that redistribute wealth, then we are likely to conclude
that the thrust for market-based reforms is not a stand-alone
movement—it is nestled in the shift toward neoliberalism on a
global level.
At the same time standards-based reform was being transformed into a monitoring regime—one might say a modern
Panoptican—other reforms, including the advent of charter
schools, attacks on teachers’ collective bargaining rights, and the
effort to restructure remuneration based on proxy measures of
productivity, employed the hegemonic logic of late-20th-and
early-21st-century neoliberal political economy
regimes—weakening public control and relying on market
mechanisms. And it will all get worse if these concentric circles
have their way—if teachers, instead of having some degree of
autonomy, become the handmaidens of assessment.
Economic logics and democratic logics will never perfectly
overlap, for education or anything else. The promotion of creative
and critical thinking might be a common ground for both economic and democratic perspectives, but from a business perspective, creative and critical thinking may have a negative aspect to
the extent they question authority structures and the status quo.
So, too, might deliberative democracy be considered an encumbrance to be overcome or an obstacle to be avoided.

Capitalist Exploitation, Good and Bad: Contending
Perspectives Historically Considered
We can group many issues together by talking about “the Problems
of capital(ism)’s excesses.” If we take the three factors of production, land, labor, and capital, the last is the dominant factor in
capitalism.44 Moreover, the way capitalism works, capital is meant
to exploit the other factors of production.
I do not necessarily mean “exploit” in a pejorative sense but
merely in the more generic sense of “to put in use.” A business
operator who employs capital and finds a job for labor or turns
2) the U.S.-instituted standardized testing on a nearly
nationwide basis in the 1990s;
3) at the same time creativity began to decline in the U.S.;
4) therefore, it is reasonable to argue that the testing regime
may well have reduced creativity;
5) and thus, it may very well have made the U.S. less
competitive than it would have been otherwise by
removing an important ingredient that helps the
economy to advance. QED. Almost.
44 This is treating capitalism in the abstract, but concrete capitalism
always involves other factors. For instance, antebellum capitalism in
the South of the U.S. can plausibly be described as a combination of
capitalism, patriarchalism, and racism. In Germany and Japan, one might
venture that the three legs of the stool would be capitalism, the inherited
post-feudal honorific system, based on notions of the landed aristocracy
and the power of the landed classes and a burgeoning nationalism that
developed in the face of military threats from other nations.
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marginal land into productive farmland is at the core of capitalism’s
energy and productivity. Moreover, business is set up to
“exploit”—to put factors of production into play and profit. This is
generally to the good, but it has a dark side, for business is not set
up to consider the negative effects on labor or land. Predictably,
workers are not always treated well, and the environment is often
abused.
In sum, nonpejorative exploitation is not sharply set off from
excessive exploitation. The difference is an ethical or moral
judgment, and that judgment is extrinsic to the core processes of
production and profit-making. What is more, ethical and moral
judgments are not made in isolation but within the context of an
interacting culture in which business has great influence.
These norms are not disinterested but socially conditioned.
Where, then, does one draw the line? What is acceptable
exploitation? What goes beyond the pale?
As for education, there are additional questions. If strategies
are proven to work in business, why would they not be applied to
education? If business engages in segmentation strategies,
shouldn’t we be likely to find them at the core of business’s
approach to education?
These are questions that should properly be considered the
terrain of deliberation in a democracy, but the emphasis on
economistic logics looks at this type of “limit-setting” by deliberation as an immense danger. So, too, is state regulation of economic
projects. When we talk about speech, we worry about chilling
effects and self-censorship. Business orientations also worry about
chilling effects on strategies and actions, as well as
the consequent decisions to curtail investment.
That is not to say that these worries are groundless, but the
logic of business focused on profit and loss for the enterprise;
considerations of social cost and social benefit are secondary and
are largely outside their purview. The logic of deliberative democracy runs in the other direction; social cost and social benefit are
primary, while the cost and benefits of individual and enterprises
are for the most part considered in that context.45
Let us, then, look briefly at the historical context of business
influence and education.
Business influence is nothing new in the U.S., and current
attacks on the public education system, which have been a constant
of the discourse on American education for half a century (see
Berliner & Biddle, 1995; Emery & Ohanian, 2004; Ford, 2012,
“Section E: Quote and Research”), are also a way of restaging
debates on education that go back to Horace Mann and the
Common School movement. More pointedly, since the late 1800s,
economic goals have been an important component informing
education in the United States.46

As identified by Kliebard (1986), there are four types of
curricula that have vied for dominance in American schools:

45 This is not to say they are equivalent—business logics can support
private profits even if they are outweighed by social costs and often,
as in the case of polluters, ignore negative externalities. Deliberative
democracy, however, must take into account private costs.

47 Valdes takes this to be the Chilean model, but it can be applied more
generally to neoliberal programs.

46 Larry Cuban’s “Making Public Schools Business-Like . . . Again,”
provides a succinct overview.
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• social efficiency, which urges that schools be oriented to
economic needs and training of the work force
• humanism, or the liberal arts tradition, which emphasizes
general intellectual skills and familiarity with the cultural
traditions of society and understanding of other cultures
• social meliorism, which sees the schools as an instrument
for social, political, and economic change
• developmentalism, which starts with the psychological
development of the learner and the needs of the individual
learner
While hardly new, the pervasive reach of business-oriented
approaches is the most notable aspect of education reform since
the 1980s. For the last nearly 40 years, the first goal has eclipsed the
others. Consequently, social efficiency had been defined in terms
of economic goals, and the humanist perspective has been challenged by the ideal of a “modern individual,” competitive, entrepreneurial, and acquisitive, in keeping with the creation of a
“nation of owners” (see Valdes, 2008, p. 6.).47 In accordance, social
meliorism has a new, highly influential strand—a school, with
roots in the works of Joseph Schumpeter and Ayn Rand, in which
the entrepreneur is the hero of history. Finally, developmentalism,
in the most common neoliberal view, can be adequately addressed
through Skinneresque theories and a type of mechanical causalism
in which incentives, primarily monetary incentives as provided by
the market, create the motive force of social change.

Business Logics and the Marginalization of Democratic
Deliberation
It is noteworthy that the “social efficiency” approach, while not of
recent vintage, was not how education was argued for in the early
days of the republic. While it seems quite plausible to us that
Americans prior to the 1860s would view education as an instrument of economic advance and development, “explicit connections
between economic development and education by contemporaries
were infrequent and vague. . . . Nowhere was the contribution of
education to economic growth emphasized . . . Even in treatises on
political economy written by Americans in the 1820s and 1830s,
education was a minor theme” (Kaestle, 1983, pp. 25–26).
Rather, education was seen in terms of vice and virtue. The
want of education led to misery, immorality, and distress for
the individual. Also, “republicanism united concepts of virtue,
balanced government and liberty,” and inculcation of the virtues of
“discipline, sacrifice, simplicity and intelligence” were essential for
the creation of republican citizens (Kaestle, 1983, pp. 4–5).48 It was

48 Kaestle pointed to Jefferson, Noah Webster, Benjamin Rush, and
George Clinton as holding these views but questioned to what degree
these were put into effect, noting that the institution of property taxes for
schools was widely opposed.
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this virtuous citizenry who would maintain that liberty and
virtues, in turn, depended upon the education of all so that not
only could the best men refine and articulate the general will but
so, too, would the general population see the wisdom of their
decisions.
With industrialization and urbanization, business influence
was reflected in the model of mass education that developed in the
first third of the 20th century and became the norm, more or less,
for the rest of the century. That model has not been phased out, but
it has been challenged by a wave of business influence that is
markedly different.
Moving away from heavy industry to lean production and
emphasizing how the individual must prepare themselves to shift
from one employer to the next, perhaps a dozen times in a lifetime,
a new model of education developed that represented “a sea change
from the traditional outlook American business leaders [had]
brought to school reform: one that sought to sort students and
select only a few for higher-education, while sending the rest to the
manufacturing, agricultural or service sectors.” In contrast,
business reformers now
coalesce around an agenda that includes implementing Common Core
academic standards and tying teacher evaluation, job security, and
pay to students’ test scores. The underlying idea is that extraordinary
teachers, with high standards for all students, can prepare every child
to attend and succeed in college, regardless of a student’s
socioeconomic disadvantages. (Goldstein, 2013)

Merit, specifically honed to find its place under the new, neoliberal
sun, was at the core of the model; at the same time, public asset
privatization, sky-rocketing college tuition, wage stagnation, and
lower salaries for public school teachers made the model seem
disingenuous.49
49 While different studies find different results on changes in teacher
remuneration, when adjusted for inflation, salaries have gone down
somewhat nationwide, but with a wide variation among states, with
Indiana having a 15% decline since 2000 and North Dakota having
a 20% increase. Business Insider, using data from the Department of
Education’s National Center for Education Statistics, found that while
nominal teacher salary has increased, when adjusted for inflation, it was
“about 1.3% lower than the $61,275 (in 2017–2018 dollars) average in
the 1999–2000 school year” (Perino & Kiersz, 2019). The Rockefeller
Institute of Government’s “Teacher Salary Trends, 2002–17” tells us
“average teacher salaries have grown across the nation from 2007–17
[but] in a number of states these increases haven’t kept pace with the
salaries of other occupations” (Malatras & Simons, 2019). It is not clear,
however, whether their figures were adjusted for inflation, but it seems
they probably weren’t. (They included one piece of information that
was really instructive, a table listing “Median Teacher Salary by Wealth
Category” in New York state. In the wealthiest, “Low-Need” districts, the
median was $113,164; in “High-Need Urban/Suburban” and “High-Need
Rural”—the least wealthy—median salaries were $71,092 and $56,613
respectively; in “Average-Need,” the median was $65,106.) EdSurge,
using data from the National Education Association (NEA) and the
National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), claimed there was a
drop of 1.6%, adding “pay adjusted for the cost of living . . . decreased
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While it is beyond the scope of this article, it helps to put these
developments in historical context. We will look briefly at the
conditions that made possible the advent of neoliberalism through
several pathways: by force of arms in Chile, through the ballot box
in the UK and the U.S., and with the aid of International Financial
Institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in
much of the developing world. To focus specifically on education,
one should then go on to look at how public K–12 education in the
U.S. has been affected.50
As Slavin (1999) once noted, education in the U.S. has been in
“an uninterrupted state of reform . . . since the publication of A
Nation at Risk” in 1983 under the Reagan administration and then
continuing into the first of the Bush administrations. While he
made this comment two decades ago, reforms have continued
apace and uninterrupted reform continues. As just indicated,
Slavin went on to note that “throughout that time, the main focus
of reform has been on school governance and accountability”
(p. 325). The link between governance and accountability—how
they have shaped one another—may be the key to understanding the reform process.
A Nation at Risk (National Commission on Excellence in
Education, 1983), like other influential documents before it, linked
the nation’s temporary failures in international competition to the
supposed and systematic failures of the school system. All in all,
the purposes of education were narrowed, with civics, art and
music, and physical education being marginalized and science,
technology, engineering, and math (STEM) programs expanded.51
The emphasis became job and college readiness; “accountability”
became a watchword of those who called for systematic reform;
and a single metric of “achievement”—achievement as measured
by standardized tests—became ascendant.
as much as 15 percent between the years 2000 through 2017” (Abamu,
2018). Finally, the NEA itself announced, “Average Teacher Salary Down
4.5 percent, NEA Report Finds,” based on its annual “Rankings of the
States 2018 and Estimates of School Statistics” (NEA, 2019).
50 Again, this is something I work to do in both Social Learning and
Hegemony (Ford, 2016a) and Democratic Education and Markets (Ford,
n.d.). The two works are interconnected.
51 As an almost embarrassed afterthought, some STEM programs added
the letter “A” for “Art,” to become STEAM in about 2014. STEAM is a
movement championed by the Rhode Island School of Design (RISD). It
nonetheless still has an economic motivation:
In this climate of economic uncertainty, America is once
again turning to innovation as the way to ensure a prosperous
future. Yet innovation remains tightly coupled with STEM
to STEAM Science, Technology, Engineering and Math—the
STEM subjects. Art + Design are poised to transform our
economy in the 21st century just as science and technology
did in the last century. We need to add Art + Design to the
equation—to transform STEM into STEAM. (STEM to STEAM
website, accessed June 2016, http://stemtosteam.org/)
If it works, maybe we will all see the clouds move across the sky and
get to pick the building that we want to live in.
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One must also consider whether, in supporting both free
market orthodoxy and the idea that schools be reformed on
a market emulation model, reform has made room for those who
would privatize, profit, and at the extreme, engage in predatory
corporate behavior (see, for instance, Faux, 2012). This is a
systematic issue—in opening public education to private enterprise, inevitably there is a systematic effect as individual incentives
aggregate and become a political force.
These numerous and parallel efforts do have substantial
effects, so this does not necessarily mean that we must resort to
“conspiracy” theories. “Movement” might be a better word, or we
could speak of it as a reaction to circumstances. A blackout and an
electrical outage are not part of a conspiracy among looters to
create the conditions possible for looting, but when the conditions
are right, then people will step in—it is predictable, and sociologists presumably can pretty much tell us with a reasonable degree
of accuracy which situations are more likely to result in looting
(Genevie et al., 1987; Leverentz, 2012; Rosenfeld, 1997).
Economists presumably can make similar predictions about
markets—that, since a market with minimal regulations will have
actors who are less than high-minded, some unsavory things will
result. But here the analogy breaks down, for presumably the
looters do not have any influence on the electric company. Those
engaging in predatory practices and profiteering, however, do have
political influence and therefore may very well have effects
on policy.
I don’t want to be as alarmist as the sometimes literally
inflammatory looting analogy suggests—this is the extreme end of
things. But it is also worse than looting (and closer to a conspiracy)
in that the parallel efforts at reform have as a goal opening up the
public education system to private enterprise. These include
presumably nonpredatory, but profit-making, enterprises—“good
corporate citizens,” such as Microsoft and Facebook—that engage
in broad philanthropic endeavors but also have agendas, in terms
of both their core businesses and creating a business-friendly
environment overall (see Greene, 2015; Reckhow & Snyder, 2014;
Snyder, 2015).52
Here the prestige of innovation is used in order to appropriate
authority, but instead of pursuing that path, let me for now just
mention that the reputation of being the new thinkers who will
“lead us to a better world” is counter-balanced by some more
typical business leanings. Microsoft was long famous for short-
term contracts and the use of temporary workers; they were not
52 More accurately, it is the Gates and Zuckerberg foundations rather
than Microsoft and Facebook themselves. I tend to think that distinction
is not all that important. Even if there is a wall between the mother
corporation and the philanthropic foundation similar to the wall
between the business, news, and editorial sides of a news organization,
one would be surprised to find that the offspring foundation had
markedly different views than the founders who started the companies.
While that is not as likely to be true of older foundations, such as
Annenberg or Ford, it would be true of newer ones, which invoke
“venture philanthropy”
and “social entrepreneurship” and claim to be innovative, ambitious, and
strategic—in short, more like a business.
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only a leader in technology, they were also a leader in the
implementation of many neoliberal business practices, including
hiring so-called “perma-temps,” long-term temporary employees
who work for an extended period for a single staffing client.53
Outsourcing to business service providers potentially allows
for reductions in wages for the contracted-out jobs (Houseman &
Heinrich, 2015). In particular, the word “perma-temp” refers to a
form of domestic outsourcing that reduces wages and contributes
to worker insecurity; in contrast with “offshoring,” the service
provider is located in the same country.54 Like outsourcing,
offshoring is one of multitudinous global processes of neoliberalism and market orientation in which increasing pressure is put on
local labor markets and on individuals to be flexible. As Bourdieu
(1998) stated, “competition is extended to individuals themselves,
through the individualization of the wage relationship.”
This makes social logic subservient to business imperatives—
businesses must compete; society must adapt to business necessities. There is little room for deliberation and democratic outcomes
because the market allows few and limited options.
The analogy is with Darwin: You must find your niche in the
supposedly natural world of economic competition. As Harvey
(2005) argued, what is left is only a core economic logic based on
competition and efficiency—the well-being of individuals can best
be advanced “by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms
and skills within an institutional framework characterized by
strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade” (p. 2).
Conceptions that are at the center of liberal democracy, such as
conceptions of fairness and liberty—the Rawlsian essentials that
we find in Gutmann’s work—are de-emphasized and redefined in
business-friendly terms.
Anti-union arguments are a chief example of this. Because
they do not accept the outcomes of the market, the labor organization is derided as the formation of distributional coalitions that are
somehow thought corrupt. But this is a more general phenomenon. Fairness is not the chance to follow a path that leads to
self-realization—it is to have equal access to the limited opportunities the market provides.
Education is a chief example. It is reconfigured; “the fatal
obstinacy” of the discipline of economics “plays a determining role
in the production of goods and services as in the production of the
producers themselves” (Harvey, 2005, p. 2). In this framing,
education is never taken on its own terms. Beyond that, the
imperatives of education in general—building community, looking
to the well-being of future individuals—and of democratic

53 In 2000, Microsoft Corp. paid
$97 million to settle a federal lawsuit from employees who
claimed the software giant classified them as “temporary”
workers for years to deny them standard benefits such as health
insurance and the lucrative employee stock purchase plan,
thereby saving the company millions. (D. Wilson, 2000)
54 The term seems first to have arrived in print with Eisenberg, 1999.
See also Houseman and Heinrich, 2015.
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education in particular, what Gutmann calls “conscious social
reproduction,” are explicitly rejected.
The justificatory discourse presents
the economic world [as] a pure and perfect order, implacably
unrolling the logic of its predictable consequences, and prompt to
repress all violations by the sanctions that it inflicts, either
automatically or—more unusually—through the intermediary of its
armed extensions, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
and the policies they impose: reducing labour costs, reducing public
expenditures and making work more flexible (Bourdieu, 1998; see also
Blyth, 2013a, 2013b; Stark, 2006).

Given this background of ideological (and real) struggles,55 we
should not be reprimanded for thinking there was an effort to
reform the education system that had to be politically organized
and institutionally secured. Could this include a refutation of
Gutmann’s work? While it does require one to include events, such
as the 1983 issuance of A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for
Educational Reform, that predate the 1987 publication of
Democratic Education, this is a case that is not hard to make.
For one thing, previous to the book, Gutmann published
articles on democracy and education (Gutmann, 1982a, 1982b,
1983a, 1983b), and it is highly likely that there were drafts of the
book in limited circulation. But I remind the reader that the
argument is not that neoliberal education reformers actually sat
down and read Gutmann’s book and only then decided on a
strategy to reshape the schools. Rather, I find it really curious that
one could read the reform movement in that way and make sense
of it.
In this way, the “conceit” I spoke of was preceded by puzzlement. What such a reading would reveal is not merely differing
opinions but a fundamental opposition between those who want
the schools to develop and implement programs promoting
55 Advocates of the market often claim that they are “without ideology.”
“End of ideology” (e.g., Bell) and “end of history” (e.g., Fukuyama)
arguments depict the liberal order—the combination of liberal
democracy and mostly self-regulating markets—as the culmination of
human history, an institutional end point. I am instead using “ideology”
in a nonpejorative sense, as descriptive and conveying foundational
understandings, much in line with the way an anthropologist or
sociologist would use “culture.” As Geuss (1981) has pointed out, the
use of the term “ideology” differs depending on research context. In
the context of social anthropology (i.e., the study of human social
organization), ideology can be used in a “purely descriptive sense” that
“is non-evaluative” in that one neither praises nor blames those who have
an ideology (pp. 4–5). In other words, calling something an ideology
means the question of whether it is good, bad, too simplistic, or too
complex is held in abeyance. Indeed, my assumption is that everyone has
an ideology—less biased, more biased, whatever. To criticize someone
for having an ideology would be like criticizing someone for breathing.
While that doesn’t mean the air we breathe isn’t sometimes bad, the
holding of an ideology is a necessary element, and we will breathe
whatever is there. (Someone has suggested that I should quote David
Foster Wallace on fish and water; instead, but I think I will stick with just
this.)
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deliberative democracy and those who want schools shaped to
meet economic ends. It may even call for a great work of synthetic
political theory that would bring these two different approaches
together, but that is hardly what I am trying to do here.
Rather, at the risk of repeating myself, this is a heuristic
approach—a practical method of discovery that makes no claim
that it is optimal or perfect or true. The comparison is meant to
show that opposition in detail and how the education reform
movement in the U.S. since the 1980s has both changed the basic
structure of our public education system and given insufficient
weight to its democratic purposes.
Both came after the 1970s, when the locus of global power
shifted. Individual national economies, all with their own national
bourgeoise, become increasingly integrated, forming “historic
blocs”—dominant configurations of material capabilities,
ideologies, and institutions—forged by elites and that transcend
territorial boundaries.56
In the post–World War II period, national bourgeoises
competed with one another in a manner different than in the
period after the 1970s. There was a shift in hegemony not so much
from one state to another as from state organizations to a transnational system of organization emanating from the ensemble of
institutions which comprise private enterprise. States are important organizations in this depiction but hardly the only organizations and not necessarily the dominant organizations. Smaller
states, such as Honduras or Guinea, might be best described as
nodes on the international system.57
To put this simply, instead of competing national
bourgeoisies—which I prefer to call a national investor class—there
is a transnational assemblage of investor classes that is networked
and interlinked. Enterprises might be dominated by investors from
one nation, but they made connections with economic actors
from multiple nations. From a world that could be best described
as consisting of national investor classes who saw it was to their
advantage to enter into alliances or arrive at class compromises
with labor so as to decrease the possibility of social and economic
disruption, we entered into a world in which investor classes were
increasingly transnational and competed with each other less on
the basis of national cohesion and more on their ability to develop
a global supply-and-distribution system that took advantage of
wage differentials and moved employment to those locations that
came closest to the perfect combination of highly skilled, highly
compliant, and low-wage workers.58
56 The term “historic bloc”—sometimes “historical bloc” (but never
“historic block”)—has its origins in Gramsi.
57 This view was suggested to me by Doug Chalmers of Columbia
University during his office hours many years ago.
58 This is hardly an original analysis. For an extended treatment with
draws on Gramsci, Robert Keohane, John Lewis Gaddis, Robert W. Cox,
Giovanni Arrighi, Stephen Gill, Michael Mann, Adam Prezworski, and
others, see Ford, 2017, 2018. (I am working on a volume on this as
well.) To anticipate a question, I would guess that the current president’s
efforts to use tariffs to reshape the global system and create a more
cohesive national investor class will not succeed; there is too much in
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This is, I hope, obviously an oversimplification, but we see
results that tend to confirm the description. Income inequality in
the U.S., which had been decreasing steadily until 1973, began
widening in a process that has kept steady pace with declining
union membership and increased ratios of CEO-to-worker pay,
from about 20:1 to 350:1 (Keizer, 2018). Interestingly, this is also the
time period in which the U.S. adopted policies that caused it to go
from being a creditor to a debtor nation (Cline, 2005, ch. 1;
Kilborn, 1985).
A Nation at Risk brightly reflects these changes. While
Gutmann’s work is principally normative and does not attempt to
grapple with the politics around A Nation at Risk, it nonetheless
anticipates the change in education by outlining precisely what A
Nation at Risk is not—A Nation at Risk is not an effort to change the
system in order to sustain democracy in the long run. Instead,
from A Nation at Risk onward, most education reform was
explicitly oriented toward economics.
The National Commission on Excellence in Education,
commissioned by Reagan’s first secretary of education, Terrel Bell,
came out with A Nation at Risk, which embodied a results-oriented
orientation that was meant to supplant input-based measures.59
While labeled a “report,” A Nation at Risk looked much more like
an advertising insert in a Sunday paper. It did not have a “white
paper approach” with full attributions; instead, it was presented as
a glossy brochure without much support for its assertions and no
consideration of research that would point in different directions.
Indeed, there was not much reference to research at all.
It did, however, have among its most famous lines, “If an
unfriendly foreign power had attempted to impose on America the
mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well
have viewed it as an act of war” (National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983, p. 5). From here the die was cast—the
link between our economic performance and our educational
system was at center stage of education debates. Of course, the
question was what to do with it.
A Nation at Risk did take a long-term perspective on how to
build the institutions of public education, but it also made what
the way of sunk investment in the global assembly-line version of free
market enterprise. [Note: Written pre-Covid. Pandemics may change this
calculation, for instance, in favor of regional autarky.]
59 It is commonplace of conservative critiques to dismiss the importance
of inputs and to instead focus on outcomes. Such approaches, sometimes
labeled “outcome-based education,” are usually coupled with an attack on
unions as rent seekers:
The education system still measures its performance primarily
by inputs, not by results. Its bureaucratic management structure
insists that schools comply with uniform rules and policies
and track resources with precision. But it has no capacity to
encourage and reward good teaching, to weed out incompetent
principals, or to ensure that children actually learn. (Finn,
1997)
Of course, such views are in harmony with neoliberal programs
that seek to cut back on social expenditures and programs that
redistribute wealth and income.
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seemed to be deliberate efforts to avoid addressing social causes of
school failures. It then pinned the blame for economic and
educational failures on educators. While there was no suggestion
of introducing vouchers or tuition tax credits, both of which had
been advocated by Reagan during the 1980 campaign, that was
because they were considered nonstarters politically—neither was
popular with the broader public, and Democrats had a significant
majority in the Houses of Representatives. Instead there was an
emphasis on two elements: rigorous teacher training and a
common and traditional educational core that would be the basis
of a state-by-state patchwork quilt that would cover the nation in
nearly uniform, and presumably higher, standards. Thus, the
standards movement became the main avenue of education
reform just prior to the publication of Democratic Education
(Gutmann, 1987).
Despite the fact that the education reform movement had
already began, Gutmann’s book is almost a handbook, helping to
catalogue elements of the business-oriented conservative program.
We can identify three main trends:
First, efforts to offer alternatives to traditional public schools,
which eventually primarily manifested not in vouchers but in
school-choice options, especially the enormous growth of
charter schools from the late 1990s onward. This co-opted parental
authority.
Second, the standards movement and calls for rigor and
“excellence in education,” which throughout the 1990s increasingly
became linked to the use of standardized tests to evaluate student
performance and to hold districts and schools “accountable” for
student performance. This limited the role of the state by narrowing the curriculum.
Third, changes in school organization and labor relations that
allowed for greater discretionary power for administrators and cut
back on the autonomy of teachers, eventually reflected in changes
in teacher evaluation systems that linked a teacher’s rating to the
same standardized tests that accessed student performance. This
shifted the authority from classroom educators and principals to
administrators outside the school and outsource suppliers of data
systems, assessment systems, and curricula.
These three elements are not separate, but interlinked, with
the system of examinations at the center. It is the instrument used
to implement changes, define new goals, and determine if they
have been attained. The overarching premise was that the
identified “achievement” problems, even if they were socially
rooted, could be solved by changing the schools.
This can be placed within the framework of a powerful and
influential critique—the critique of public enterprise that is nearly
omnipresent and from which comes the belief that business
management can bring about untold efficiencies, fire the
incompetent, and thus use the same or fewer inputs to get better
results. It really isn’t all that complicated; the theory goes, it isn’t
that there are deeply ingrained social pathologies—it’s just a
management issue.60
60 As Andrew Rice (2011) pointed out, “this idea gets a lot of traction on
Wall Street.” He quotes Brian Zied, a hedge fund manager who tutored at
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Testing used for evaluation is the indispensable element of
the system and is the lynchpin of educational reform. Once “rigor”
and metrics of student performance were established, schools and
teachers could be ranked and could be found wanting. Once
traditional public schools were labeled somehow wanting—as
“failing”—there was a justification for revamping their
organization and for expansion of school choice. Once “standards
of excellence” and their measurement were widespread, the
teachers’ position in this new system—especially teachers in
schools that had a record of falling short of that standard—could
be redefined so as to more closely resemble an at-will employee
dependent on their supervisor’s goodwill than a professional
whose expertise
and experience were a source of authority.
“Authority” is the key word in this account, and the main
question concerns how business interests organized politically and
institutionally secured their position. There was a political
movement to implement measures in the school system that would
emulate the market, especially increased competition and more
power for administrators to hire and fire whomsoever they
pleased. Thus, there was an authority shift away from teachers to
administrators. In addition, the purview of parents’ authority was
circumscribed, focused on choosing among school options;
instead of a citizen acting to best improve the schools, the parent
became a consumer choosing a school. Finally, state authority was
not conceived expansively to provide a broad education that
includes arts, music, physical education, and civics but narrowed
to focus on academic achievement and primarily academic
achievement in terms of future economic outcomes.
Business influence is most effective not when it is direct but
when it transmutes other sources of authority. The three sources of
a charter school in Harlem and has become a donor:
You interact with the kids for a few minutes, and it immediately
hits you that, wait a minute, these kids can learn like any other
kids. They just need to be put in an environment with high-
quality teachers who care about outcomes. Frankly, it’s the same
incentive system that works in 99 percent of all businesses. You
reward the people that do well, and part ways with the ones that
don’t. (para. 16)
What Zied did not seem to realize was that he was already dealing
with a select group of students: the ones who show up for tutoring. They
differ considerably from those who do not. This is akin to mentoring
schemes in business where you select promising candidates to fill a role
in your organization; my guess is that such programs were a model for
many business-influenced education reforms. In my own experience,
teaching at schools in the Bronx that are challenged to meet academic
standards, the students who stay after school for tutoring are the ones
who least need it. The ones who attend do need extra help—they are
often a few years behind in reading and math—but they are usually our
more diligent students, and others could use that help more. It is the
students who have spotty attendance records who are most at risk, and
they tend not to show up for after-school tutoring programs. However,
programs that emphasize arts, music, or sports and have a social
component have more success.
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authority in Gutmann’s (1987) account have been transmuted in
substance by the politically organized and alchemical influence of
business, but it goes beyond that. As its aim seems to be to refute
the other premises and principles of Gutmann’s work, Gutmann’s
analysis can serve as guide to the conservative program. First, it
counters Gutmann’s principle of nonrepression by asserting the
primacy of the market and calling for society to be modeled by an
entrepreneurial ethos. Second, it disavows Gutmann’s principle of
nondiscrimination in favor of school choice and a system of
selection by supposed merit.
Most striking is the method—this fourth source of authority
seeks to co-opt, alter, or attack the other three and channel them to
its purpose. Parental authority is no longer pointed to the citizens’
task of ensuring the good of the system as a whole. The focus of
state authority is narrowed to “student achievement” as defined by
measures that are linked to economic success and a monitoring
system to ensure “accountability” is implemented. The authority of
professional educators is attacked, and a radical reform of the
teaching profession based on “best practices” in business is
proposed and advanced.
Generally, the goal of creating a deliberative democracy
engaged in conscious social reproduction is eschewed in favor of
accepting the outcomes of the market as dictated by the march of
great leaders of talent pursuing simultaneously their own self-
interest and their own idiosyncratic vision. This is the core of
business influence and how it operates. It is no longer “the foremost role of public education is to foster basic democratic principles (such as equal opportunity and liberty)” (Ben-Porath, 2004),
but education is an instrument to other ends. It advocates the
pervasive theory that, if not the family, then the state and educational professionals might in fact be the source of a problem that
could be solved by applying common sense—the common sense of
what works in business.

The Common Sense of Segmentation
There is a grave danger here, for what works in business is not
always something that works in democracy. In business, inequality,
class, and stratification are not necessarily concerns—in fact they
may be seen as opportunities. For instance, one business strategy is
to see stratification as a fact and to employ segmentation as a
business strategy. In so doing, there is little room for the goal of
enabling democracy or promoting empathy or self-realization in
other than business-oriented terms and what is likely to result is a
string of oxymorons. Stratification is not to be addressed—it is to be
accepted as the normal consequence of the market system.
Moreover, many of the reforms, even while claiming to close
the achievement gap, are likely to build on and increase social
stratification. Let us then, at the risk of sounding polemical,61
further examine this connection between business influence and
education reform. While on the surface we see arguments about
fairness and improving educational opportunities for all children,
the underlying mechanics of business point elsewhere. The public
61 Of course, engaging in polemics is hard to resist when one is at the
same time examining polemics.
feature article

25

face of education reform, for all its seemingly cogent arguments,
serves to conceal a business-oriented agenda of privatization, state
retreat, and restructuring of labor relations so as to be more in line
with at-will employee/contract-worker models. To put it another
way, it is informed by the eye of the profit hunter.
The question then becomes, what happens to education when
the primary ethos of a society is acquisitive, grasping—in short,
monetary?
Looking at the dynamic of stratification, it points to something new that, while it is not so neatly delimited, we can nonetheless see clearly in the institutional forms of publicly funded
education. While stratification itself is not new, business strategies
that aim to segment the market in education have shown robust
growth. Since the 1980s, marketers have used economic and
behavioral theories combined with data heavy analytical techniques to identify “market segments and product differentiation
opportunities” (Dickson & Ginter, 1987, p. 1).
What private business strategies do is “segment the market.”
This involves the subdivision of a market or population into
segments with defined similar characteristics—dividing a broad
target market into “subsets of consumers” who have common
needs and priorities and then designing and implementing
strategies to target them:
Knowing your target market is the first step in selling your products
and services. A marketing segmentation strategy further divides your
target market into subgroups that are easier to manage. Customized
customer experiences lead to higher customer loyalty and better-
focused marketing campaigns. A market segmentation strategy
organizes your customer or business base along demographic,
geographic, behavioral, or psychographic lines—or a combination of
them. (CMG Partners, n.d.)

There are many aspects to this. “Five major segmentation
strategies are (1) behavior segmentation, (2) benefit segmentation,
(3) demographic segmentation, (4) geographic segmentation, and
(5) psychographic segmentation.” Sometimes the strategies combine
different elements, such as selling snow gear to winter-camping
enthusiasts in Idaho. But “demographics are the most common
form of segmentation. They divide customers by the structure of
certain population traits: Age, Gender, Income, Occupation,
Marital Status, Social Class, Religion, Education” (Business
Dictionary, n.d.). You’ll notice “race” is not explicitly listed as a
category, but there are proxies.
In education, we’d have to add “parental status,” but the other
factors are nonetheless operative and have become more operative
as the school choice movement has advanced. Part of this has to do
with the neoliberal hegemony we have experienced for nearly half
a century, but as Campi argued, the school choice movement is not
merely a reflection of abstract “hegemonic rationalities” that are
“rooted in the elite intellectual belief in the efficiency and innovative force of the competitive market form”—it is also rooted in a
disparate coalition of “tactical actors seeking paths to agency amid
a field of political possibilities” (Campi, 2018, pp. 401, 399). It is also
rooted in business opportunities, and these two converge in the
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process of segmentation, for these disparate groups create a
segmented market.
While “hegemony” might be described in part as that which
shapes norms and limits what is considered possible, thus placing
constraints on politics (the so-called art of the possible), hegemony
is also more than that. Whatever hegemonic rationality there is
does not float down from the clouds but must be realized in
specific situations—in other words, hegemony is not just a set of
ideas and norms but must be implemented and instituted in
concrete situations and continuously reinforced.
In the case of school choice, Campi (2018) identified three
groups in an unstable alliance: parents of minority students
(specifically Black and Latinx parents) in urban areas, Christian
parents, and advocates of education reform who argue the schools
are the chief terrain of the struggle for “new civil rights.” One is
reminded that George W. Bush, in promoting No Child Left
Behind, called education “the civil rights issue of our time.”62
Stirring as that rhetoric may be, one may still wonder to what
extent some of these are true grassroots movements and which
are shell organizations funded by those who have other agendas
as well.
Undoubtably much of the support for school choice comes
from parents who are dissatisfied with the offerings of public
education. Campi (2018) mentioned, for instance, the Christian
Right, and the example is illustrative. First, it shows that politics
does make unlikely bedfellows, as there is a significant element of
the Christian Right that is segregationist, and yet they seem to be in
alliance with those saying, “Education is the battleground for civil
rights.” But the Christian Right is hardly a grassroots movement, or
if it is, it is a carefully cultivated one.
Campi (2018) pointed out that in these circles “parental
control became synonymous with market-based reform [emphasis
added]. . . A range of libertarian, conservative, and free-market
foundations . . . provided the bulk of funds and organizational force
to school-choice campaigns at the local level . . . funding private
schools and [providing] massive flows of grants to support
city-based voucher school campaigns” (p. 415). Other groups, such
as the Walton Family Foundation, the K&F Baxter Family Foundation, the Wasserman Foundation, the Eli and Edythe Broad
Foundation, and the Gates Foundation, are strong supporters of
charters. Their activities are wide ranging, and they seek to
influence opinion and policy; for example, three of them—the
Baxter, Wasserman, and Broad Foundations—also financed the LA
Times coverage of public education while Broad also backed “a

62 See Ravitch’s (2009) discussion of “the faux-Education Equality
Project (EEP), now headed by former New York City’s Schools
Chancellor Joel Klein and the Reverend Al Sharpton, with the assistance
of former House Speaker Newt Gingrich.” “Education is the civil rights
issue of our time” is a popular phrase, variations of which have been used
by Barack Obama, Arne Duncan, Mitt Romney, and DT and Frank Luntz
(see E. Brown, 2017).
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proposal to convert nearly half of Los Angeles’s public schools into
charter schools” (Farhi, 2015).63
Thus, while school choice has some reason to be thought of as
a “grassroots movement” instead of an assemblage of Astroturf
groups, the grass is tended much like the fairways and greens of a
country club’s golf course. The parents who benefit are a significant
force,64 but they are only one element, and their tactical moves are
generally limited by other players—they do not have the reach to
change the limits of the possible by themselves.
Interested parties include not just those who would benefit
directly from school choice programs, such as charter school
operators, but those who want to see the “hegemonic rationalities”
of market-based norms, such as cutbacks to public enterprise,
reductions in transfer payments, and the structuration of employment on an “at-will” employee model, to predominate. As for those
who are actively in the business of education, school choice leads to
segmentation.
The consequences are evident in school reforms that use
market-style mechanisms of parental choice and competition
between schools. The argument is such systems will “leverage
change by compelling schools to diversify options, develop
innovations, and increase effectiveness,” but the effect is quite
something else; “rather than promoting diverse curricular options
for a wide range of potential students, schools often adopt
marketing strategies . . . designed to attract ‘better’ students, often
from schools that are already considered to be successful”
(Lubienski, 2003).65
And that threatens democracy. At least in part it threatens
democracy because charters and other privatization measures are
not scalable. Rather, they tend to create concentrations of students
who have advantages, either in terms of income and wealth or in
terms of parental education and involvement.
To put it bluntly, they cherry-pick; many children are left
behind, and public schools are left to take care of them. As Ravitch
(2010) has put it, “charter schools siphon away the most motivated
students and their families in the poorest communities from the
regular public schools” (p. 227). Ravitch also pointed out that
Albert Shanker, who in 1988 was one of the first to propose
63 The Los Angeles Times Editorial Board (2015) endorsed the Broad
plan in an editorial.
64 I should point out that as a public school parent, I have taken
advantage of school choice nearly every time I have had the opportunity
to do so. While I have limited myself to public school choice, navigating
the systems in Washington, D.C., and New York to find the best
education possible for my child, if the best option were a charter school,
I would have considered it. It seemed to me that my duty as a parent
obligated me to do so, but I should also note that to some extent it
diverted my attention from improving the public schools. Finally, even
as I was working within the public school systems, I found it abundantly
clear that public school choice programs also create problems of inequity.
65 Lubienski’s work was based on an examination of school responses to
competition in two local education markets, so it is rather small-scale,
but it indicates that “schools often act in ways that reflect contradictory
incentives for how schools might engage the marketplace.”
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charters, thought of them as “a school within a school [created by
teachers], where they could develop innovative ways to teach
dropouts and unmotivated students.” But, as she recounted, by
1993, “Shanker publicly renounced his proposal. The idea had been
adopted by businesses seeking profits, he said, and would be used,
like vouchers, to privatize public schools and destroy teachers
unions” (Ravitch, 2018).66
Having had my daughter go to just such a “school within
a school” for two years, I would like to share two anecdotes. The
school, which we absolutely loved, was considered very successful.
It was in a large urban district, however, and the area in which it
was located had started to gentrify a while back. While it was a
public school (not merely, as charter schools are, a publicly funded
school), the demographics changed over time, even more so than
those of the neighborhood. It became a school educating children
of mainly upper-middle-class parents.
One point of that anecdote is to point out that public schools
are not immune to the effects of demographic shifts or the concentration of more affluent students in one school and less affluent
students in another. But that only came about because of the
institutional structure of the district—it allowed for a degree of
public school choice, so parents could seek out the school instead
of attending the local, zoned school. I do not blame the
parents—after all, I was one them, seeking out the best education
for my child—but rather, point out that school choice programs
have some less-than-palatable consequences.
The same can be said about how we draw district boundaries,
especially how urban districts and suburban districts are divided.
On reason for this was well put by Katz, who said in 1975 that he
expected “that any serious effort to equip poor children as effective
competitors for the well-to-do will meet enormous, and probably
successful resistance” (Katz, 1971/1975, pp. xviii, 152).
Charter schools are peculiar, however, because they combine
two elements. They are both an example of public asset privatization (Goodman & Loveman, 1991, pp. 26–28, 32, 34–36), and they
are concentrated in poor, urban areas—you do not find them in
affluent suburban enclave districts (see, for instance, Mckenna,
2015). The asset in this case is to receive public funds in order to run
a school. Charter schools generally receive public funding but have
their own management and governance structure, so they’re free to
adopt different disciplinary rules, a separate selection process, or
other policies. Charter schools open up mainly in poorer districts,
however, and tend to separate out the kids who seem to have the
most potential and most supportive parents. Thus, the siphoning
effect, in Ravitch’s phrase, or the culling of students, in mine, both
pose “the problem of replicating a model that depends on concentrating promising students” (see Ford, 2012, p. xxxvi).
While charters account for only about 5% of students who
are publicly funded, they are polarizing because they take money
from public schools, which can’t easily lower their costs as they lose
per-pupil budgetary allotments and lack access to additional
sources of funding through private donors (Kardish, 2013; Mead et

66 The article provides a brief summary of her critique.
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al., 2015).67 Moreover, they are part of an increasingly stratified
system. For Ravitch, “American education seems to be evolving
into a dual school system, one operated under democratic
control . . . the other under private control” (Ravitch, 2018).
I would disagree (quibble?) that it is not merely a dual
system—it has more than two aspects when you consider public
school choice, magnet schools, home schooling, private schools, and
the like—but she is absolutely correct in emphasizing the contrast:
While public schools districts are “required to find a place for every
student who shows up, no matter that student’s academic skills,
language or disability,” the same is not true of a “privately managed
charter [school, which] can limit its enrollment [and] exclude
students it doesn’t want” (Ravitch, 2018).68 Some state charter laws
(and they do vary drastically) limit the freedom of charters in hiring
uncertified teachers and in rejecting students because they have
special needs, but by no means are all limited in this way.69
The second anecdote concerns how the central district treated
my favorite daughter’s school. The local educational authority was
in favor of expanding charters—at the moment roughly a third of
the districts’ students go to charters. At one point, when my
daughter’s “school within a school” came to a bureaucratic
hurdle—its student body size did not fit into any of those approved
by the central district—the school administration was faced with a
choice: either embark on an expansion plan or “turn charter.”
The second option was brought up constantly. Why the
central district did not just say the school could continue in its
present form was never clear, but they would not waive what were
newly established size restrictions even for a school that had been
exemplary for nearly 20 years. The school eventually decided to
expand, adding not only additional classes but grade levels. Part of
this was because parents wanted the school to add the grade levels,
part of it because the teachers wanted a challenge, and part of it was
because space was available, but the end result is that the old school
ceased to exist—

67 Kardish used a 4.6% figure; an “almost 6%” figure comes from Mead
et al. The updated version from January 2019 still had the same figure
and reported that charter school growth has slowed recently.
68 She added that charters can target particular grade levels, for
instance, not running high schools, which are more expensive. She also
noted that “charters can even close school for the day to take students to
a political rally for the school management’s financial benefit. That is not
fair competition, and it is not healthy for democracy.”
69 Comparisons of state laws usually have criteria that are often
chosen for political purpose—that is, they are either advocates, such
as the Center for Education Reform, or detractors, such as the Citizens
for Public Schools. Two less politically charged comparisons include
“Charter Schools in the States—A Series of Briefs,” by the avowedly
bipartisan National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) (http://
www.ncsl.org/research/education/charter-schools-in-the-states.aspx)
and “50-State Comparison: Charter School Policies,” by the Education
Commission of the States (ECS), https://www.ecs.org/charter-school
-policies/.
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a different school took its place, and the previous remains in
name only.70
So that leads to the question of what happens to the public
system re-concocted under business norms. It is not to say there
are things the public schools could do better, but it is to question
whether we have lost sight of what public schools are supposed to
do.
One of those things is to train future citizens so they can
contribute to a democratic polity. This is the issue of deliberative
and participatory democracy. Another is to ensure that we have a
system that provides a way to meet one’s individual goals regardless
of one’s background. This is the issue of egalitarian democracy.
That the public schools have not always been successful in these
areas is not sufficient reason to dismantle the system unless there is
another system that can perform those functions. This is especially
the case when the system works reasonably well—and often quite
well—for 80% of the population, with its failures largely found in
areas of concentrated poverty. One must question the motives of
those who want to overhaul the entire system when the parts of the
system that do not work as well are for the most part found side by
side with multiple social pathologies that also go unaddressed.
Another anecdote, this one about the use of a metaphor: at a
recent parent meeting at a public school on the Upper West Side of
Manhattan, a well-spoken father, who was also an advocate, spoke
out against plans to change the selection process for a set of magnet
schools. He used this metaphor: “We need to create the lifeboats to
get the kids off a sinking ship.”
I don’t know how many lifeboats he had in mind, or whether
the kids would stay in the lifeboat or be transported to another ship
that presumably wasn’t sinking, but this really bothered me. Maybe
it was because I was thinking of when the Titanic went down, and
there weren’t enough lifeboats to get everyone off. The man was
talking about tracking and magnet schools and, while maybe this is
something I inferred, saying “deserving kids” needed to be saved.
But what about the other kids? Were they undeserving?
The promise of egalitarian democracy is largely based on the
promise of public education—that it function to educate the vast
majority of citizens so that they may aspire and succeed, to
participate in politics, to help to shape the future.71 At least that is
70 Based on interviews with teachers at the “school within a school” and
observations at parent-teacher conferences, spring 2011. I do not want
to identify the school. It should be noted that since I did not have full
knowledge of all interactions and that I was not an insider, the choice
among options may not have been as stark as I have portrayed it, but one
thing I know for sure is the teachers in the school told me that the central
district was constantly asking, “Why don’t you go charter?”
71 While I do not want to try by myself or in this article, the difference
between egalitarian democracy and deliberative democracy is relevant.
One way of approaching it might be through a Rawlsian lens, invoking
the original position, that while deliberation might lead to a consensus
(with the emphasis on “might”), what is desired is a generally egalitarian
outcome. The question of how much inequality the original position
would allow is, of course, one that can be argued about just about forever
(see, for instance, Wolff, 1977).
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one of the major theories in support of universal and compulsory
education in the U.S. As Horace Mann put it, “Education then,
beyond all other devices of human origin, is the great equalizer of
the conditions of men, the balance-wheel of the social machinery”
(Mann, 1848). The argument is that, without a public education
system that works, in effect, to redistribute economic opportunity
to the next generation, democracy under a free market system is
much more likely to result in a stratified society with limited social
mobility. Whether democracy can still function under such
conditions is left an open question.
One essential question we need to work to answer is whether
contemporary education reform is leading our national education
system off in directions seemingly far removed from our shared
understandings of what is necessary for a democracy to function.
The stratification and segmentation of the public system has
followed a period in which the problems of education have been
articulated in economistic terms. Among many consequences of
the economic patterns we have been following—and which have
greatly influenced the national educational system—is that public
education seems not to be working as a leveling device, certainly
not in outcomes and not even in terms of creating a level playing
field and equal opportunity.
What is common sense in business does not necessarily lead
to the common good. Public goods are more than aggregations of
private goods. They require not merely the aggregation of individual interests and desires but an understanding of what a public
shares in common.
While I was not aware of it until recently and was taken aback
when I first heard it, this now seems to be a point of some contention.
Pointing out that there has been a shift in the way some practitioners
typically define the concept in the field of economics, Abowitz and
Stitzlein (2018) argued it is no longer merely that a “public good is
available for all individuals to freely share and virtually impossible to
exclude others from enjoying” but that “many economists go further,
claiming that public goods are aggregations of private goods [emphasis added]—things that serve the needs, desires, and interests of
individuals. In other words, public goods are those items that are
preferred by and benefit the largest group of individuals.”72 This
would be a huge change in the normative aspect of economics, for a
new definition creates new norms.
While I have not read all the original articles and am not
prepared to fully enter the discussion at this point, two points
should be made. First, the change in definition is a potential
foundational shift as it changes a fundamental definition that is
central to the discipline of economics and public policy; by so
doing, it skews economic analysis and argumentation in a new
direction. Thus, it is potentially a major change.
Second, such a shift in definition within an academic discipline is one of the leading indicators of a shift in hegemonic
rationality. That shift can be considered as a shift away from
Keynesian understandings to those that wound up with Hayek and
Friedman. From a Keynesian perspective, this is dangerous, for
when each individual pursues their own interests without regard to
72 For the first quote, they cite Anomaly, 2018.
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the interests of others, the results can be disastrous, such as falling
wages in a competitive labor market, which lead to lower consumer
demand, which leads to lower production, which results in even
lower wages, and so it goes on. As one leftie Scottish academic put
it, “Keynes’s central message is that individual rational action can
be collectively disastrous” (Blyth, n.d.). The role of deliberation in a
democracy might be considered, at least in part, an effort to keep
the market from falling into such death spirals.
There is also a third point to be made regarding whether
public education is a public good, but it comes from a different
source. Many who embrace market-based education reform do
strongly deny that it is a public good, but they do not, however,
necessarily use this new definition. Instead, they suggest that
education should not be treated as a public good as a matter of
public policy. For instance, Corey DeAngelis (2018) of the Cato
Institute sticks closer to the economics definition but claims that
schools need not be public goods by raising the question of
whether publicly funded schools should have the option to
exclude. He has argued that
by the strict definition, schooling is not a public good . . . that cannot
avoid the economic free-rider problem, in which it’s impossible to
exclude those who have not paid for a service. Schools can do this, if
they choose, and that’s precisely why private schools already function
effectively today without government operation or funding.

Arguing somewhat differently on the public good and
education, Kevin Currie-Knight has defined a public good as being
non-rivalrous and non-excludable, arguing that “K–12 education
has neither of these qualities. First, it is rivalrous,” making the
argument that there will be rivalries over access to resources,
such as smaller class size, and, second, “K–12 education is also
excludable,” using the example of disabled children who were
“quite easily excluded from K–12 education” until 1975 (Curry-
Knight, 2017).
Both, along with other commentators who used some version
of the traditional economic definition, usually are making the
argument that public education is not a public good because it is not
good. That public “goods” should result in private goods is not an
argument without merit—for instance, a public park that became a
toxic waste dump could hardly be thought of as a public good, and
neither could air that, while non-excludable, was hazardous to
health. However, that does not justify the converse, that something
that results in private goods is therefore a public good.73
73 I would hold that a public good still needs to be non-excludable. This
is a point on which Currie-Knight agrees but which DeAngelis does not;
they are, in fact, making quite different arguments. I would disagree with
DeAngelis; the mere fact that something might benefit the largest group
of individuals does not make that thing a public good. This is especially
true if the benefit of the larger group is at the expense of the excluded
group, an argument that I think one could apply to tuition tax credits,
charters, vouchers, etc. (It could even apply to slavery, I guess, if you took
seriously the antebellum writings on Locke and the Liberty of Plantation
owners.) And, of course, they do not necessarily help the largest group
of individuals but are more likely to divert resources to a select few. A
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DeAngelis has said this is true “especially when the
government often runs schools like they run the DMV.” He then
promoted his forthcoming study
to calculate the net effects of government schools on U.S. society
overall . . . by comparing the results produced by government schools
to those produced by a feasible policy alternative: private schools. . . . I
find that government schooling has huge negative effects on society
overall. The preponderance of evidence suggests that government
schooling—relative to private schools—reduces student learning and
increases crime rates at a higher cost to the taxpayer.

While he said that he “make apples-to-apples comparisons [by
using] the most rigorous private school choice evidence available
on academic outcomes, criminal activity, and taxpayer costs”
(DeAngelis, 2018), unfortunately, he is avoiding the central issue:
His private “apples” can exclude, and his public “apples” cannot.
This is not to deny that there might be merit in the program
DeAngelis advocated, “a universal education savings account
program,” a voucher-type program that allows families to take their
education dollars to the schools that work best for their children,
but the funny thing about that is that most current supporters of
such a program probably would not provide sufficient funds so that
less affluent families would have a true choice.74 I have speculated in
the past that almost everyone’s position on the vouchers would
switch if the voucher were equivalent to the tuition at elite private
schools. Teachers and teachers unions would be happy about the
additional resources for education and would probably anticipate
higher salaries because of the additional revenues; those who worry
about government expenditures would be against a voucher
program with a high price tag (Ford 2003, 2004).
The overall point is that while it may not be naturally non-
excludable and non-rivalrous, a government can decide that it can
be made so in law and, by coming to a political decision, attempt to
implement what it defines as a fair system, one that could include a
principle of non-excludability. Similarly, after appropriate political
deliberation, it can be proclaimed as a principle enshrined in law
that we will not allow discrimination, either on the basis of
intellectual choice or social, economic, and demographic
background.
This statement of principle is possible within a democratic
system after proper deliberation. While the federal government
does not, many states do have rights to education within their state
constitutions, including Massachusetts, which has perhaps the
main example is Chile, in which the educational opportunities are not
equitably distributed.
74 Bella Rosenberg, former special vice president of the AFT, put it this
way:
The pervasiveness of market metaphors is quite striking.
Ed[ucation]. was one of the last holdovers; no more. And
underlying the “choice” argument is this: the shift from collective
to individual responsibility. Basically, vouchers say go choose
(not that we’ll give you enough money to make REAL choices)
and if you happen to choose wrong, tough. (Personal email,
May 1999)
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highest-ranked public system in the United States. Indeed, such a
statement pretty much became a requirement for a territory to
become a state (or for a state that had succeeded to be readmitted)
by the late 1860s, and “all 50 state constitutions guarantee
education today. . . . The reasoning of both Congress and the state
conventions was clear: ‘Education is the surest guarantee of
the . . . preservation of the great principles of republican liberty’”
(Black, 2017).75
There is, of course, the matter of the practical implementation
of the principles, but while privatization and defunding public
schools may make sense in some theoretical instances, I don’t agree
that public education deserves the same reputation that the DMV
does. To be sure, I’m not even sure the DMV deserves its own
reputation. My bet about the DMV is that it works all right
overall—well in some states, less so in others—and while it is true
that going to the DMV may be inconvenient, they are pretty good
with keeping track of records. Also, the DMV plays an essential
role in making sure people comply with insurance and other
regulations, and despite the fact that they can be used as a
whipping boy for those who want to whip up emotions against
bureaucracy and the state, DMVs all over the country perform at
least an acceptable level given the conditions they perform under.
I hate going to the DMV, but it is not because they are incompetent; it is because they are overcrowded. It isn’t the service, but it
is the wait for service, and that problem could be solved pretty
easily by hiring more people. Should the state pay for more people?
I don’t know—when I am waiting in line, I think absolutely yes, but
if my taxes went up by $100 to shorten my wait by 20 minutes, I
would doubt it. Maybe at some level there are a lot of people at the
DMV who accept that they will have to wait because they think it
will keep costs down.
While there might be some corrupt or totally incompetent
DMV in a few states, or in a few locations within states, but I don’t
think that adds up to an urgent call to privatize the DMV. Similarly,
I don’t think the public schools are corrupt or incapable; though
there certainly are some historical examples, they do not add
up to an urgent call to privatize public education. Besides,
private corruption and incapacity has a long lineage as well,
so privatization has its own risks. What I see all the time is that
about 80% of the public schools are doing fine academically—
that schools that are deemed “failing” are disproportionally, and
maybe almost exclusively, found in areas of concentrated poverty.76
75 Black’s is an opinion piece in favor of a federal right to education,
which we do not have as yet, arguing, “Without a federal check,
education policy tends to reflect politics more than an effort to deliver
quality education. In many instances, states have done more to cut taxes
than to support needy students.” There is a through line, which continues
in an April 26, 2018, tweet by Black, “States cannot continue to ask public
schools to work with whatever is left over and then criticize them for
doing a poor job. This cycle creates a circular justification for dismantling
public education when states should be repairing it.”
76 The rate of failure of American schools, while exaggerated, if
it exists at all, is often supported by test data. Tests vary, but on
international tests, basically, the U.S. is in the big bulge in the middle.
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Private entities might even ask for extra incentives to work in such
areas, perhaps labeling them “education enterprise zones.”
This does not fit with the monopoly model explanation of
failed public schooling. It is widely argued that “government
schools . . . because of residential school assignments . . . currently
have a significant amount of monopoly power in the education
market” and therefore have negative effects on the economy. The
argument is that in education
as with any other industry, monopoly power—and lack of consumer
choice—leads to a lower quality product at higher costs. Government
schools are also strapped with heavy regulations such as teacher
certification requirements, standardized testing mandates, the
prohibition of admissions criteria, and severely limited principal
autonomy.77

This is another argument that eats its tail. There are actually
two arguments. One is that an apples-to-apples comparison shows
an advantage for private education. Another is—and it is
true—that public schools have additional regulations, and it might
well be true that this hurts “performance” as measured by some
metrics. But if government regulation hurts public school performance, then it is not a fair apples-to-apples comparison at all,
especially if the private schools are able to turn down students at
the schoolhouse door, especially if they are high-poverty and/or
high-needs schools.
Public schools may have the advantage of being quasi-
monopolies in some residential districts, but it also may be that one
unified school district may have distinct advantages over several
competing private school options, that they might, in terms of
offering diverse course offerings, special education programs,
transportation, counseling services, extracurriculars, and other
items, have an advantage. Their size may be a benefit.78 They might
even be compared to natural monopolies in many ways.
Taking the average scores and rankings for the eighth-grade Progress
in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS) in 2006, the U.S. is
ranked 18th out of 45 (10th out of 20 OECD countries), ahead of France,
England, Austria, New Zealand, and Norway, among others; the 17
ahead of the U.S. include four Canadian provinces, so if Canada was
listed once, the U.S. would be 14th. Just like the scores, explanations
vary as to U.S. rankings. Steve Krashen said this is about what we should
expect once we factor in poverty levels. Also, according to Iris Rothberg,
in the United States, socioeconomic status accounts for close to 80% of
the difference test scores (Rothberg, 2011). Supplemental educational
services (SES) is also reflected in racial disparities (I doubt it is the other
way around); in the 2006 Program for International Student Assessment
(PISA), “on the combined science literacy scale in the United States,
Black (non-Hispanic) students (409) and Hispanic students (439) scored
lower, on average, than White (non-Hispanic) students (523).” For
comparison’s sake, South Korea ranked seventh among OECD countries
with an average of 522; Finland was first with 563, Mexico dead last with
410 (see Baldi et al., 2007; Bybee, 2009).
77 This comes from DeAngelis (2018), but it is a common enough theme
in attacking public schools.
78 This is much the same logic as employed by the Harlem Children’s
Zone and the Obama administration’s Promise Neighborhoods program,
democracy & education, vol 28, n-o 1

But I am not trying to come to a definitive resolution of the
public-private question, just point out that there are other
perspectives. On the one hand, the way the apples don’t line up
should not be dismissed. On the other, it needs to be pointed out
that public schools take on responsibilities that private schools
don’t, and that is something
we have decided is a good idea as a country.
Public schools have additional responsibilities. They could be
cheaper if we did not impose those responsibilities on them. There
was, however, a political decision that we would adopt certain
regulations and certain principles. They were supposed to be worth
the cost. To some extent, they line up with Gutmann’s (1987) two
principles. We don’t exclude; we don’t discriminate—at least, those
are our stated principles.
Private schools are not held to that. Private religious schools
are sometimes explicitly discriminatory, based on faith.79 It is not
just that the apples don’t line up. The terrain of modern public
education was built on these promises, on democratic decisions
after some sort of deliberative process. Clearly there could be a
different democratic decision after further deliberative
process—clearly we could be in the middle of such a deliberative process now—but if that process is going to maintain
deliberative democratic decision-making and, perhaps, advance
egalitarian concerns, then it is going to put conditions on the
institutions of education that are publicly funded.
For Gutmann (1987), the public shared in the deliberations
that are the substance of democratic self-governance. Public
education has been thought of as one of the bedrocks of a democratic republic since at least Adams’s and Jefferson’s time. Jefferson
the latter established under the legislative authority of the Fund for the
Improvement of Education Program (FIE).
The vision of the program is that all children and youth growing
up in Promise Neighborhoods have access to great schools and strong
systems of family and community support that will prepare them to
attain an excellent education and successfully transition to college and
a career. The purpose of Promise Neighborhoods is to significantly
improve the educational and developmental outcomes of children and
youth in our most distressed communities, and to transform those
communities.
It is, however, oriented to support and declare eligible entities
only if they are other than public entities, “including (1) nonprofit
organizations, which may include faith-based nonprofit organizations,
(2) institutions of higher education, and (3) Indian tribes” but excluding
public entities, such as school districts (US DOE, 2018).
79 We should consider the religious aspect when deciding whether to
expand the thumbnail sketch of true believers who firmly believe that
research shows that we should adopt these measures to improve the
system; political actors who want to adopt these positions for political
advantage; and those who see the adoption as advantaging them
economically. Religious communities wanting to bring up their children
in religious schools are both true believers and political actors but of a
different sort in each case—true believers in the value of religion and
political actors who want parents holding those beliefs to influence they
children. In terms of anti-public-school sentiment, religiously oriented
parents are a large and significant group.
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argued that there was a direct correlation between literacy—
defined rather broadly—citizenship, and successful self-
government (D. L. Wilson, 1999, p. 80). As Adams put it, “a general
knowledge and sensibility have prevailed among the people,
arbitrary government and every kind of oppression have lessened
and disappeared in proportion” (Adams, 1765).
We should consider this as our educational system is increasingly influenced by business interests. Public education has many
goals, but free societies require citizens who are self-governing,
and we cannot allow public education to not serve those needs and
merely function as a market. We can return to Adams, who had
singular success in calling for assertive and energetic government
intervention. He did so in his own state by drafting the Massachusetts Constitution, the one referred to previously, the oldest written
constitution still in use today. While he expected it to be stricken,
what he wrote remains in the constitution to this day:
Wisdom, and knowledge, as well as virtue, diffused generally among
the body of the people, being necessary for the preservation of their
rights and liberties; and as these depend on spreading the
opportunities and advantages of education in the various parts of
the country, and among the different orders of the people, it shall
be the duty of legislatures and magistrates, in all future periods of this
commonwealth, to cherish the interests of literature and the sciences,
and all seminaries of them; especially the university at Cambridge,
public schools and grammar schools in the towns; to encourage private
societies and public institutions, rewards and immunities, for the
promotion of agriculture, arts, sciences, commerce, trades,
manufactures, and a natural history of the country; to countenance
and inculcate the principles of humanity and general benevolence,
public and private charity, industry and frugality, honesty and
punctuality in their dealings; sincerity, good humor, and all social
affections, and generous sentiments among the people. (“The
Encouragement of Literature, etc.,” chapter V, section II of
the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts)

Whatever his other faults, Adams should be given great credit,
for his support for education was not limited to a privileged elite
but was tied to conceptions of the mutual interdependence and the
destiny shared by all members of a society: “Laws for the liberal
education of youth, especially of the lower class of people, are so
extremely wise and useful, that, to a humane and generous mind,
no expense for this purpose would be thought extravagant”
(Adams, 1776).
One hopes his words are not just a dead letter. One hopes that
there will still be room for this type of serious and deliberative
decision-making that is central to maintaining a democracy, that
decision-making as it exists in consumer choice does not squeeze it
out, and that decision-making as it exists in business practice and
consumer choice will not deny its purpose. But we’ll see.

Note on Other Works to Which This Article Is Connected
This article is the first of four on the “Sources of Authority in
Education,” all of which use the work of Gutmann as a heuristic
device to describe and explain the prevalence of market-based
models of education reform in the United States. The present
democracy & education, vol 28, n-o 1

article, “Negating Amy Gutmann,” looks primarily at deliberative
democracy. The next, “Neoliberalism and Four Spheres of
Authority,” considers, primarily, the promise of egalitarian
democracy and how figures such as Mann, Dewey, and Gutmann
have argued it is largely based on the promise of public education.
It thus begins with a consideration of what might be called a partial
historical-materialist analysis—the growth of inequality in the
United States (and other countries) since the 1970s that correlates
with much of the basis for changes in the justifications and
substance of Education reform. The third article, “The Odd
Malaise of Democratic Education and the Inordinate Influence of
Business,” begins by offering some historical background and
comparisons and ends by considering what happens to the
philosophy of education when democracy and capitalism are at
odds. The fourth article is on changing notions of civics, “Profit,
Innovation and the Cult of the Entrepreneur: Civics and Economic
Citizenship.”
All are included together in a book manuscript, hopefully to
see the light of day, Democratic Education and Markets:
Segmentation, Privatization, and Sources of Authority in Education
Reform. The book as presently planned begins with a theoretical
chapter on paradigm change.80 The book also includes a suggestive
conclusion, “Robert Pirsig, John Dewey, and John Adams: Defining Quality, Efficiency, and the Benefits of Liberal Education.”
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